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After more than ten years of transformational processes, the economic structure of 
Russia changed drastically. During the Soviet era, many phenomena in the Soviet economy 
could not be analyzed from a traditional economic point of view because of its peculiar 
centralized organization and the extraordinary administrative power of the government. 
Under the socialist regime, corporate governance problems could not be discussed because 
many of the firms were controlled by the sectoral ministries directly. Banking system was 
completely different in the Soviet Union from that in western countries; that is, Soviet-type 
banks did not play any roles in financial intermediation. A large part of interregional labor 
distribution was controlled by somewhat strict internal passport system introduced during 
the Soviet period. 
The situation has, however, changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Corporate governance, the banking sector and the regional economy turned into most 
discussed issues in the study of the Russian economy, among others. In accordance with 
the systemic change in the Russian economy, stylized analytical methods have begun to be 
applied in investigating the Russian economy. It is against this background that we 
organized an international workshop entitled "New generation of Russian economic 
studies" supported by the Institute of Economic Research at Hitotsubashi University on 
December 6, 2005. This book represents one of outcomes from the collaboration between 
Russian and Japanese young scholars. We hope this volume could be beneficial to the 
readers of Russian economic studies and make a contribution to the further development of 
the field of so-called ‘Economics of Transition’ as a whole. 
 
 
Kazuhiro Kumo and Fumikazu Sugiura 
January 2006   vi
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Konstantin Kozlov and Ksenia Yudaeva   2
Imitations and Innovations in a Transition Economy 
 




It is widely believed that Russian firms do not innovate. This belief is based on 
the conjecture that Russian firms should conduct R&D and introduce absolutely new 
products with the same intensity as do firms from the developed countries. At the same 
time, “distance to frontier” theory suggests that firms from countries, located far from the 
technological frontier, can grow quite fast not by introducing absolutely new technologies, 
but by copying technologies and products, developed in other countries (Acemoglu et. al 
2002a,b). In many cases such development by imitation strategy can produce faster growth 
rates than attempts to grow by doing innovations.   
By using two different statistical sources, this paper shows that the overall innovation and 
imitation rate in Russia is not that low.    Russian statistical office Goskomstat reports that 
about 9% of all enterprisers innovate every year.  The small enterprise level survey, 
which we conducted together with the Institute of Economies in Transition, produces a 
slightly higher number: more than 40% of enterprisers report being involved in innovative 
activities in the last tree years. In line with distance to frontier theory, more than half of 
Russian enterprisers, which report doing innovations, in fact simply imitate foreign or 
other firms products, or introduce well-known technologies.   
  Competition with either domestic or foreign products is the main factor, which 
stimulates both innovations and imitations. At the same time, credit constraints are the 
major obstacles to innovations. Interestingly, those firms, which innovate, in comparison 
to those, which imitate, pay special attention to relaxing credit constraints. Such firms are 
usually better in terms of corporate governance. They also more often complain about 
unavailability of external financing, but these complains can rather be explained by the 
fact that such firms look for external finance more often than imitating firms.   
  When asked directly, firms rarely complain that quality of their personnel and   3
management is an obstacle to innovations and imitations. At the same time the probability 
to imitate is positively correlated with presence of managers, which received some 
training abroad. It appears that imitating firms follow “westernization” strategy: they copy 
both western technologies and managerial techniques. Education of managers is less 
important in the case of firms, which report introducing only absolutely new products or 
technologies. This finding is a bit at odds with the theory, which claims that managing 
innovations is more complicated than managing imitations.  At the beginning of 
transition, in countries such as Russia there was shortage of good management, while 
good personnel, which was able to conduct R&D, was available. It is possible that Russian 
management is better in managing innovations, produced by domestic human capital, than 
in managing imitations of products, developed by foreign human capital. Therefore, 
imitating firms pay special attention to education of managers. 
  We should notice that, as it often happens in transition economies, the quality of 
our data is far from perfect, and our fundings can be at best considered as suggestive. 
Nonetheless, they allow making several conclusions. There are two factors, which can 
help to increase innovation and imitation rates in Russia. These factors are: building better 
financial system, which require improvements in corporate governance, and improving 
education of managers. It is often believed that quality of management is more important 
for innovation-based strategy than for imitation-based strategy. In reality the situation is 
probably even more complicated. Quality of management is so poor in countries, located 
far from the technological frontier, that even imitation-based strategy requires substantial 
investment in education of management. Preserving relatively strong competition, 
particularly with imported products, is one more factor, which will help to stimulate 
innovations.  
  The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide some 
descriptive information on innovative activities of Russian firms. Section 3 describes 
theoretical basis for regression analysis and results, obtained in other studies. Section 4 
briefly describes data sources, and construction of variables. Section 5 analyses the results 
of regression analysis, and Section 6 concludes. 
   4
Basic Facts about Innovative Activities of Russian Firms. 
 
The data on innovations, which we use in this study, are coming from two 
different sources. The first one is the enterprise survey, conducted specially for this paper 
by S. Tsukhlo from the Institute of Economics of Transition (IET). The innovation 
questioner was sent by mail to the sample of 1200 firms, which usually participate in the 
monthly surveys conducted by S. Tsukhlo, and 724 responded to the questioner. Most of 
firms, included in the sample, existed in pre-transition period.  The sample is slightly 
biased toward machinery and chemicals in expense of fuel industry. The original sample 
of firms, to which the questioner was sent, is also biased toward metallurgy, but these 
firms had low response rate. Graph 1 compares the industrial breakdown of this dataset 
with the industrial composition of the Russian industry, reported in the official statistics. 
The GKS-total variable corresponds to the industrial breakdown, reported in the standard 
Goskomstat industrial statistics for 2001. The IET-total variable is the breakdown of 
industrial production of firms, to which the IET questioner was sent. The questioner does 
not have questions on output, so production data are obtained by merging the IET dataset 
and the Russian firms’ registry.  The IET-innovations variable reports breakdown of 
production of firms, which responded to the innovation questioner. As in the case of the 
total IET sample, production was obtained by merging IET sample with the firm registry. 
Graph 2 reports regional breakdown of the IET sample and its comparison to the 
Goskomstat data. Again, both samples are more or less representative, with slight bias 
toward Ural region, in expense of Siberia and Far East. Such geographical bias is a natural 
result of the bias of the industrial breakdown toward machine building sector, because a 
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The IET questioner contains questions about types of innovative activities, goals 
of innovative activities, sources of funding, and obstacles to innovations. The survey 
shows that about 87% of firms are involved in innovative activities in the last three years. 
This number looks too high, particularly in comparison to the official statistics (see below). 
It seems to be consistent with other non-official survey data. Krasnochtchekova (2000)   6
provides data from The Russian Economic Barometer (REB) survey of innovative 
activities of firms in 1993-96. According to REB, the percentage of firms, which were 
involved into either product or process innovation in these years, was fluctuating between 
58-63 percent. The REB sample is similar in nature to our sample, and the hypothesis that 
in the early 2000s the percentage of firms, involved in innovations, increased by about 
25% in comparison with 1990s sounds reasonable. Nonetheless, the statistics on the 
number of firms that innovate in this dataset can be biased upward. It can happen because 
firms, which are not involved in innovation activities, may have lower incentives to 
respond than the firms, which are involved in innovative activities. If we assume that all 
firms, which have not replied to the survey questioner, are not involved into innovative 
activities, then the resulting percentage of innovative firms will be equal to 41%. As we 
will show below, this number is still higher than the one in the Goskomstat data. 
Another characteristic of innovation activities, used in this survey, is difference in 
innovation rate with 1980s. Enterprisers were asked whether they think that today they 
innovate more or less than in 1980s. About 36% of enterprises responded that their 
innovation rate increased since the Soviet times. 
  The second data set was constructed using Russian Statistical Agency 
“Goskomstat” publications on innovation activities of Russian firms in 2001 and 2000. 
These publications summarize the results of innovation surveys, which Goskomstat 
conducts on the annual basis. The publication does not give a lot of details on the sample, 
but it appears that the original database covers about 25000 Russian firms. The sample of 
firms is representative for the Russian industry, and closely follows the industrial and 
regional breakdown of the overall Russian industry (see Graphs 1 and 2, variable 
GKS-innovations). The publication divides all firms on those with innovations, and others, 
and provides summary tables for the two groups of firms. Most information is either by 
industry, or by region, or both. At the end of the 2001 publication there is a list of firms, 
which were involved into innovative activities in the last three years. This list includes 
brief descriptions of innovations. The publication contains a lot of other information on 
firms, involved in innovative activities, such as sources of finance, total spending on 
innovation activities, etc. This data, however, are available only in summary tables, and   7
not available on the firm level.   
  The percentage of firms, involved into innovative activities in this dataset is  
8.5% in 2000 and 8.7% in 2001. Since these numbers correspond to innovation activities 
during one year, they are not highly inconsistent with the findings of the IET survey. 
Assuming that each enterprise introduce innovation once every tree years, Goskomstat 
data suggests that about 25-30% of firms innovated in the period 1991-2001. This number 
is below than the number, obtained in the IET questioner. However, the IET questioner 
referrers to a slightly later period (the questioner was sent out in September 2003). The 
time period, considered in the IET dataset, is characterized by higher and more stable 
growth rate, then the period, considered in the Goskomstat survey. Such better economic 
situation can explain why IET innovation rate is higher than the Goskomstat one. We also 
can not exclude the hypothesis that Goskomstat’s number is biased downward because of 
underreporting.  While in the case of the first dataset, firms, which have no innovations, 
had little incentives to respond to the questioner, in the case of the Goskomstat dataset, 
firms, which had innovations, but did not fill in the form can be mixed with the firms, 
which did not have innovations. This type of underreporting is very common in the 
Russian statistics.  Goskomstat’s questioner is much larger than the IET questioner, and 
includes not only qualitative questions about presence of innovations, types of innovations, 
problems with innovations, and so on, but also rather detailed questions about the 
percentage of funds spent on innovation activities. Russian firms can be more reluctant to 
answer the questions about finance than to qualitative questions. As a result, the 
percentage of positive answers to the Goskomstat questioner can be smaller than for to the 
IET one. In addition, Goskomstat seems to first ask whether enterprises innovate, and then 
asks to choose proper innovation activity from the list. IET questioner go directly to the 
list of innovations. It is possible that due to this difference in methodology, some minor 
innovations are not taken care of in the Goskomstat survey, but appear in the IET survey.   
Graph 3 presents the ratios of the share of firms, which innovate in each industry over the 
average share of innovative firms in overall sample. So, this graph compares innovation 
rates across industries. The variables were constructed in such a way, which allowed 



















































































relatively equally distributed across industries. In the Goscomstat innovation sample, 















Types of innovation activities 
 
As far as forms of innovative activities are concerned, there are important 
similarities in both datasets (see Table 1). Both datasets report that among innovative 
activities, major role belongs to purchases of new machines and equipment: 62% of all 
firms, which do innovations, in the Goskomstat survey, and 64% of corresponding firms in 
the IET sample are involved in this type of activities. In the IET questioner, we also asked 
for the introduction of new products, and 61% of firms, which do innovations, reported 
that they have done it in the last three years. In-house R&D are doing 33% of innovating 
firms from the IET sample, and additional 16% of enterprisers outsource R&D. 
Goskomstat divides research and development into two separate activities, and reports that 
about 33% of innovative firms are involved in research, while 37%  develop  new 
products or technologies. Almost twice as many firms, which do R&D, are doing it in 
house. The median spending on R&D (among firms, which do R&D) is 2% of total sales   9
in the IET dataset, and less than 1% in the Goskomstat dataset. Education of personnel 
was done on 24% of innovating firms in the Goskomstat study, and 31% of innovating 
firms in the IET study. About 8% of innovative firms in the Goskomstat sample, and 7% in 
the IET sample purchase licenses. Introduction of new technologies varies a lot: if in 
Goskomstat data 16% of firms are buying new technologies, in the other sample this 
number goes up to 36%.   
 
Table 1 Percent of firms, involved in innovative activities, in breakdown by activity. 
Goskomstat IET 
marketing studies  19%  marketing studies  31%   
Innovation related education of personnel  24%  education of personnel  45%   
Purchasing of new technologies  16%  introduction  of  new 
technology 
36%  
Of which: patents, licenses, prototypes  8%  purchases  of  licenses  or 
patents 
7%  
Innovation-related purchasing of machines and 
equipment 
62%  purchase of new 
machines and equipment 
64% 
      
in-house R&D  33%  Research and development of new products and 
technologies 
33% 
outsourced R&D  16% 
      
Purchasing of IT products  27%     
Development of new products, and preparation 
for production of new goods and services 
37%    




Both surveys contain question about marketing studies. About 19% of 
Goskomstat firms, and 31% of IET firms do it. Goskomstat asks about purchases of new 
computer programs, and 27% of innovating firms did it. The question about education of 
personnel is formulated differently in two datasets. Goskomstat specifically asks about 
innovation-related education of personnel, while IET treats all education activities as 
innovations. This difference in formulations may explain difference in responses: only 
24% of the GKS sample in comparison to 45% of the IET sample reported that they 
educated their personnel. 
The IET questioner tries to separate development of absolutely new products and copying 
of already existing ones (see Table 2). Surprisingly high percentage of firms claim that   10
they introduced absolutely new product or technology (27% and 13% respectively). About 
one third of all firms report that the new product they introduced is a small improvement 
to the one, which existed before.   
 
Table 2: Characterization of new products/technologies.   
 new  products  New 
technologies
this is an absolutely new product/technology developed on our firm 27% 13% 
this is an absolutely new product/technology developed by Russian
specialists 
12% 8% 
This is a small improvement of the technology/product, which we
already have on our firm 
34% 29% 
this is a technology/product, widely used abroad, on which we
bought a license 
5% 5% 
This is a widely used technology/product for which we bought an
equipment 
23% 22% 
this a copy of a foreign technology/product, which was developed
at our firm (or by other Russian specialists) 
15% 8% 
Note: the numbers do not sum up to 100%, because firms were allowed to mark more than one answer. 
 
  Notice, that in Table 2 percentages do not sum up to 100%. This is related to the 
fact that firms were given the opportunity to give several answers to this question.    It 
is possible that firms introduced several innovations during the period in question, and 
these innovations were of different types. Among 727 firms, which replied to the 
questioner, 226 firms either do not make innovations, or did not specify their type, 196 
firms only conducted imitating innovations (raw 3 to 6 in Table 2), 148 firms introduced 
only absolutely new products or technologies (raw 1 and 2 in Table 2), and the remaining 
157 firms have innovations of both types (marked more than one answer in Table 2). Table 
3 provides cross tabulation of answers to the questions about activity types and 
characteristics of activities. In this Table and other tables, which use the same 
classification of firms, we call positive answers to questions 1 and 2 in Table 2 
“innovations”, and answeres to questions 3-6 “imitations”. This table allows checking 
whether firms give reasonable and consistent answers to similar questions. Interestingly, 
those firms, which introduced both absolutely new innovations and imitations, are   11
involved in innovations of all types  more  often.  Quite  reasonably, these firms, and firms, 
which introduce absolutely new products and technologies, are doing R&D themselves or 
outsource R&D more often than firms, which are involved into imitations.  In contrast, 
the latter firms purchase machinery and equipment more often. They also educate their 
personnel slightly more often than the firms, which introduce absolutely new innovations. 
Conducting innovations may be self-educationary, so those firms, which do innovations 
themselves, do not need to spend time and resources on educating their personnel to use 
equipment, developed by other firms. However, education of new personnel is even more 
popular in the case of firms, which do both absolutely new innovations and imitations. 
Interestingly, imitating firms conduct marketing studies less often than innovating ones. 
The highest rate of doing marketing studies is among those enterprisers, which do both 
innovations and imitations. 
 








in-house R&D    23% 41%  53% 
outsourced R&D  8% 22%  31% 
introduction of new products  63% 63%  79% 
introduction of new technology  34% 32%  55% 
purchase of new machines and equipment 77% 39%  75% 
education of personnel  44% 38%  64% 
marketing studies  26% 32%  48% 
purchases of licenses or patents  6% 7%  11% 
Note: Firms, which did not answer to the questions regarding innovative or imitative types of activities, are 
omitted.  
 
Reasons for innovation activities: 
 
  The IET survey asks firms why they like to be involved in innovative activities. 
About 73% of firms, which replied to this question, do it in order to improve financial 
situation. It appears that they often achieve this goal through decrease of the costs of 
production (64%). Increase (or preservation) of the market share (66%) or accessing new 
markets (59%) are also among the major reasons of doing innovations. The percentage of   12
firms, which consider getting access to the international market as an important goal of 
innovation activities, is fairly large – 31%, but most of the firms still consider domestic 
market as the major market for their output. At the same time, only 7% of firms would like 
to become suppliers for the foreign firms working in Russia. Only 14% consider 
innovations as a way to improve capitalization of the company. This last number is 
consistent with the finding of Guriev et al (2003), who used similar dataset to study 
corporate governance of Russian firms. Guriev et al (2003) argue that most of the firms in 
the IET sample do not care about market capitalization, because are not traded openly on 
the market. Finally, about 11% of firms answered that they consider innovations as a way 
of decreasing dependence on suppliers, meaning that these firms would like to replace 
foreign-produced or outsourced inputs with inputs, outsourced to domestic suppliers or 
produced in-house. Such behavior can be a part of cost-decreasing strategy. 
 
Table 3. Per cent of firms from each category, which mentioned the corresponding 
reason for innovation activities 






better serve demand  53% 52% 66% 
increase market share  71% 69% 83% 
access new markets  68% 65% 75% 
access new international markets  36% 34% 42% 
decrease costs  66% 68% 73% 
diversify products  23% 24% 38% 
increase capitalization  16% 11% 26% 
improve financial situation  72% 73% 76% 
become supplier for foreigners  4% 7%  11% 
decrease depandance from suppliers 11% 12% 17% 
else  1% 2% 1% 
Note: Firms, which did not answer to the questions regarding innovative or imitative types of activities, are 
omitted.  
 
  In Table 3 we compare motivation for innovation activities for firms, which 
conduct innovations, imitations, or both.  There seem to be not that many differences in 
motivations across different groups of firms. The group, which conducts both innovations 
and imitations, is slightly different from the other two groups. Firms, which belong to this   13
group, mention each goal more often than other firms. The difference is particularly large 
when they answer the question about increase in market share and product diversification. 
In addition, these firms more often than others care about market capitalization – this 
result is very interesting in light with the results about corporate governance, which we 
will show later. Finally, this firms care the most about becoming suppliers for foreign 
firms. Naturally, those firms, which conduct innovations, are the ones, which consider the 




Both data sources contain information about sources of funding for innovations, 
but they report it differently. In the IET dataset, firms report percentage of funds, used to 
finance innovations, which was raised from a particular source. Therefore, summary 
statistics, which we report in this paper, correspond to the average number across firms. In 
the case of Goskomstat data, we do not have firm level information on financing sources, 
and report the break down of sources of finance, summed up across all firms. 
  Not surprisingly, both datasets show that retained earnings compose the largest 
share of innovation finance. In the Goskomstat data, the retail earnings share is equal to 
87%. The corresponding number in the IET sample is 71%. Only 5% of all firms did not 
use retained earnings in the period of consideration. The share of government subsidies is 
almost negligible in both datasets: 3.6% in the Goskomstat data, of which the shares of 
federal and local governments are almost equal, and 2.4% in the IET data. About 91% of 
firms in the IET data did not have any government finance at all, although there are firms, 
which completely financed their innovations with the government funds. On a median 
firm, which received government funding, the share of such finance amounted to 15%. 
The share of foreign funding differs across datasets, and across years in the Goskomstat 
dataset. If in the 2000 Goskomstat book this share amounts to 6.5%, in 2001 it drops to 
1.5%. In comparison, the average firm in the IET dataset finance only 0.5% of its 
spending on innovations with foreign investments. The maximum share of foreign finance 
reaches 63%, though, and the median firm, which receives foreign finance, covers 24% of   14
its innovation spending from foreign investments. The IET dataset also provides 
information on banking credits: the share of banking finance in total funds, used for 
innovations, is 12% on average, but 43% among firms, which use banking finance. There 
are firms, which finance 100% of their innovation spending with banking finance. A small 
percentage of firms actively use credit from consumers of their products, or shareholders, 
to finance innovations. There are firms, which finance 100% of their innovation spending 
from these sources. The median firm, which receives credit from shareholders to finance 
innovations, gets 50% of its innovation spending financed from this source, and the 
median firm, which have access to credit from its consumers, covers 18% of its innovation 
expenditure from this source. Only two percent of firms in the sample ever used bond 
finance or issued new equity. Those, who did it, financed on average 24% of innovation 
expenditure from this source. 
 
Obstacles to innovations 
 
Both questioners have a section, which asks respondents to evaluate the problems, 
which they face in conducting innovation activities. The list of suggested problems 
includes financial problems, problems with finding managers, workers and other 
personnel with required qualifications, and problems with access to information and 
infrastructure. Most of firms in both datasets consider financial problems, particularly lack 
of retained earnings followed by insufficient state support, as the highest barrier to 
innovations (see Table 3).  In the IET questioners respondents ranked problems with 
finding experienced management and/or other personnel as secondary order problems, 
while infrastructure problems, lack of information, and problems with hiring foreign 
specialists are viewed as even less important than problems with    personnel. Interestingly, 
firms, which conduct absolutely new innovations, appear to be slightly more liquidity 
constraint than imitating enterprises, and enterprises, which introduce both types of 
innovations. While complains about lack of retained earnings are similarly frequent across 
all three types of enterprises, more of those enterprises, which  are involved into 
absolutely new innovations, rank lack of external finance as a significant barrier.   15
  Goscomstat questioner pays a lot of attention to such factors as economic risks. 
Enterprises were asked about economic risk directly, and about those characteristics of 
innovations, which may become a problem in the presence of high economic risk. The list 
of such factors consists of the length of the period, which is needed to return the money, 
invested in innovations, and  the costs of innovation activities. The latter factor can be 
related not only to the risk of innovation process, but also to the problem that firms are 
credit constraint. Respondents ranked such problems quite high, i.e. higher than the 
problems with personnel and infrastructure. Interestingly, when enterprisers are asked 
about lack of personnel, they rank this problem quite low, but rank quite high the problem 
“enterprise has a low innovation potential”.  Infrastructure problems are ranked higher 
than problems with personnel. This result may have some relation to the credit constraints 
problem, though, because Goscomstat ask general question about infrastructure, and not 
the specific question about infrastructure directly needed to perform innovative activities. 
Respondents to Goskomstat questioner also rank quite high the question about lack of 
legislation, regulating innovation activities. 
 
Factors, which influence innovations: theory and evidence from other studies 
 
The description of the innovation data, provided in the previous section, allows to 
make several conclusions.    In the last three years about 40% of Russian firms introduced 
absolutely new or imitated products and/or technologies. The percentage of imitations or 
incremental changes was slightly higher than the percentage of innovations. Most of 
innovations are financed by retained earnings, and enterprisers consider lack of retained 
earnings as major obstacle to innovations. Only small number of firms uses banking 
finance, although those, who use it, finance almost half of their innovation expenditure out 
of this source. Often, firms do not use banking credits not because it is not available, but 
because of habit, or because they are reluctant to do so. As a result, the percentage of firms, 
complaining that external finance is unavailable is smaller than the percentage of firms, 
complaining about lack of retained earnings. Soviet-times nostalgia explains the fact that a 
large percentage of firms in both samples complains that government do not participate in     16
Table 4 Barriers to innovation activities. 
Numbers correspond to the percentages of those enterprises, which answered to this question. In both sample both  
firms, which conduct innovations, and which do not do innovations are included. In the IET case numbers do not sum up 
to 100% in those cases, where some respondents chose “difficult to answer” option. 














































































































Lack of retained earnings  9  35  56 Lack of retain earnings  1.5  2  10  85
High costs of innovations  23  50  27 No access to external finance  11  9  19  42
 
   
You find conditions, at which 
external finance is available, 
non acceptable 
12 11  16 19
        Too high interest rates on loans 5  8  21  59
                
Lack of state support 
26 39 35
Lack of state support of 
innovation activities (subsidies, 
tax credits, etc.) 
5 6  15  60
                
low innovation potential 
61 28 11
Lack of skilled technical 
personnel at the firm  12 20  31 24
lack of skilled personnel 
65 30  6 
Lack of managers, experienced 
in managing innovative 
activities 
12 23  29 23
        Lack of skilled labor  17  23  26  21
                
Lack of infrastructure 
58 34  8 
Lack of technological 
infrastructure (research 
institutes or firms, whom you 
can contract out development of 
an innovation for your firm) 
15 24  23 16
Underdeveloped market for
technologies  55 37  8          
                
Lack of information about
new technologies  73 27  0 
Lack of information about new 
projects and technologies  16 29  23 13
                
Low demand for new goods 
46 40 14
Bureaucratic problems with 
hiring foreign skilled personnel 38 10 7  4 
High economic risk 50  40  10          
Long period of return of
investments in innovations  45 43 12       
Lack of information about the
market demand  68 27  5 
        
The enterprise is poorly
suited to introduce
innovations 85  13  2 
        
Lack of opportunities to
cooperate with other
enterprisers and research
institutes   73  24  4 
        
Low consumer  demand for
new products  60 30 10
        
Lack of legal infrastructure
for innovation activities  48 39 13
        
Uncertainty about the length
of innovation process  70 27  3 
          17
financing their innovations. Problems with quality of infrastructure, personnel or general 
uncertainty are considered as much less important than financial problems, and ranking of 
these problems can differ from one source of data to another.   
  The problem with such self-evaluation of barriers to innovations by enterprises is 
that it misses the effect of some factors, which stimulate innovations, but maybe perceived 
by managers as obstacle to innovations. Among such factors, competition has, probably, 
attracted most of attention in the literature.  Clearly, by reducing profits competition can 
have negative effect on innovations. The growth literature until recently was dominated by 
such Shumpeterian ideas (Dasgupta-Stiglitz (1980), Aghion-Howitt (1992), 
Caballero-Jaffe (1993)). This theory was not supported by empirical findings, which 
demonstrated positive correlation between product market competition and innovative 
output (Geroski (1995), Nickel (1996), Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999)). 
Positive relation between competition and innovations can be generated in the model, 
where competition increases incentives to innovate for satisfying managers, who minimize 
their effort subject to staying in business (Aghion-Dewatripont-Rey, 1999). Recently, 
various theoretical justifications of an inverse U-shape relationship were proposed 
(Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1997), Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001), Aghion 
and Howitt (2002), Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt (2002)). In these models 
firms innovate in order to increase the post-innovation rent in comparison to the 
pre-innovation rent in the neck-to neck competition environment. The difference of this 
model from the traditional Shumpeterian models is that incumbent firms are also allowed 
to innovate.   
Empirical literature from the developed countries supports the hypothesis of an 
inverted U-shape relationship between product market competition and innovations. 
Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt (2002)). Blundell, Griffith, and Van Reenen 
(1995, 1999) find positive association between the number of innovations and patents, and 
increase in domestic competition and trade openness. Evidence from Central and Eastern 
European (CEES) transition countries is mixed. Grosfeld-Tressel (2001) reports positive 
association between competition and TFP growth, Carlin, Fries, Schaffer, and Seabright 
(2001) report negative relation between domestic competition and new product innovation,   18
and positive relation between foreign competition and innovation, and, finally, Aghion, 
Carlin and Schaffer (2002) find an inverse U-shape relationship between competition and 
new product innovation. The latter result is supported in the Jefferson et al. (2002b) study 
of the R&D performance of Chinese firms.   
  Aghion, Carlin and Schaffer (2002) study interaction between competition and 
firm leverage or corporate governance, hard budget constraints or credit rationing. The 
theoretical part of the paper shows that in the Aghion-Dewatripont-Rey (1999) model 
(ADR), where managers do not maximize profit, but care about their own survival, the 
effect of competition on innovation decreases with increase in managerial claims on 
monetary profit or higher debt pressure, because these factors work as substitutes to 
competition in their effect on managerial incentives. In step-by step innovation model of 
the type of Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001) model (AHHV), competition and 
managerial claims on profit or hard budget constraints are complements. The interaction 
between competition and credit rationing in AHHV model is nonlinear. When competition 
is not too strong, and, therefore, financial constraints are not binding, increase in 
competition enhances innovation. However, when competition increases, 
Shumpeterian-type effects start to work, i.e. competition starts to exert negative influence 
on innovations through the negative effect on profit. The empirical part of the paper 
demonstrates dramatic differences between the effect of competition on new and old firms. 
While new firms innovate more than the old ones, competitive pressure boosts innovations 
on both types of firms. Foreign competition is particularly important for the old firms. Soft 
budget constraints are detrimental to innovations. Similar finding, although using the same 
dataset, was obtained in Carlin et al (2001). New firms are significantly less likely to 
innovate when they face more than one competitor. Since new firms are usually 
considered as more budget-constrained, this finding is consistent with the hypothesis that 
ADR model is more relevant for the old firms, while AHHV model is more relevant for 
the new firms.   
  Several papers study the effects of ownership structure on firms restructuring and 
innovation performance in more details. Carlin et al (2001) show that state-owned firms 
innovate less than the privatized and new firms, although fails to find differences in   19
introduction of new products by privatized and new firms. Jefferson et al (2002a) show 
that introduction of new product on Chinese firms is more or less the same for all 
ownership categories, with the exception of overseas and foreign firms. Among these two 
groups of firms, the proportion of firms, which is involved into introduction of new 
products, is rather small. In fact, such firms also spend less on R&D, which may suggest 
that they rely on headquarters in their innovative activates.  Importantly, those overseas 
and foreign firms, which introduce new products, do it with significantly higher intensity, 
than average Chinese firms. It is also interesting to report the results of Grossfeld and 
Tressel (2001) paper, although they are not directly related to innovative activities. This 
paper finds non-linearity in performance of Polish listed firms with ownership 
concentration: firms with dispersed ownership and with the concentrated one are more 
productive than the firms with intermediate concentration of ownership.   
Two other factors, effect of which on innovations is interesting to study in a 
transition economy, are corporate governance and quality of management. Throughout 
1990s Russian companies were famous for bad quality of corporate governance. The 
major goal of managers and some groups of outside owners was to get control over 
companies, and they used all possible means to fulfill this goal. At the beginning of the 
2000s, this process of ownership consolidation was finished, and owners started to pay 
more attention to capitalization of their companies. As a way of influencing capitalization, 
the companies started to pay more attention to improving relationship with minority 
shareholders. Many companies adopted new codes of corporate governance, started to 
produce accounting reports prepared using international rules, introduced independent 
directors into their board, and so on. This process started on some of the large companies, 
but it quickly spread into a number of smaller companies (Guriev et al, 2003). There are at 
least two reasons why owners of Russian companies started to behave in this way. The 
first one is that they decided to cash in the results of privatization, and attempted to 
increase capitalization of their companies in order to increase the price of these companies 
in their future sales. The second reason is that they needed to rise funds for investments, 
and they had to improve corporate governance in order to decrease the costs of such funds. 
These two different hypothesis map themselves into two different strategies regarding   20
innovations. Clearly, in the second case, when good corporate governance is a way to 
attract investments, corporate governance should be positively correlated with innovations. 
Owners of firms, which follow such strategy, care about current and future profitability of 
their firms, and make investments to increase profitability. Most likely, such increase in 
investments results in innovations or at least in imitations. In the first case scenario, the 
sign of the correlation coefficient between the quality of corporate governance and 
innovation activities is not so easy to predict. If innovations are expensive, and owners 
would like to sell of their firms quickly, firms are unlikely to conduct innovations. On the 
other hand, some cheap incremental innovations can still be undertaken, because they can 
also lead to improvement of capitalization of the firm and increase in its current profit. 
Apart from other factors, quality of management can have substantial influence 
on incidence and form of innovation activities of enterprisers. Soviet managers were not 
used to changing production profile in order to suite the interests of consumers and to 
maximize profit.  Instead, their major goal was fulfilling production plans. There is a 
substantial literature on economics of planned economies, which argue that this goal was 
inconsistent with renovation of enterprisers and introduction of new technologies and 
products on old firms. Renovations and other changes took time, thus not allowing firms 
to produce more goods to fulfill plans. This lead to problems in commercialization of 
R&D results, which were widespread in the Soviet Union. Most of innovations were 
installed on absolutely new plants, while the old ones continue to produce outdated output. 
Because of resource constraint, rate of innovations in such economy was quite low. In 
addition to this improper alignment of incentives, Soviet managers had no marketing skills. 
Soviet firms did not have to care whether consumers like their products or not. The 
wholesale and retail trade sectors were separated from production, and producers did not 
get enough signals from consumers. Producers did not care whether the good is sold to the 
final consumers; they only cared about fulfilling production plan.   
  Although transition from plan to the market economy has clearly changed the 
incentives of producers; managers’ skills have not automatically changed. Therefore, one 
can imagine that firms innovate too little because their managers do not know how to find 
or design the product, which will be popular among consumers, and how to advertise it   21
and more generally how to sell it to consumers in the most efficient way. Innovations may 
appear to be too expensive, and too risky process for such managers, and they will 
under-innovate as a result. In addition to decrease in the overall innovation rate, poor 
quality of management can result in bias toward imitations, which may look as a safer bet 
for under-qualified managers.   
 
Data and Methodology of Regression Analysis 
 
To analyze, whether factors, discussed in the previous section, have any effect on 
innovation activities of Russian firms, we use probit regressions techniques. We estimate 
whether probability of a firm to be involved into innovation activities depends on 
competition with domestic and foreign firms, credit constraints, ownership structure, state 
interventions in the regional economic activities, quality of corporate governance, and 
quality of managers. In the case of Goscomstat data, the dependent variable takes the 
value of 1 if the enterprise belongs to the list of firms, which conducted innovative 
activities in the last three years according to the 2001 publication. The remaining firms are 
the rest of the firms, included in the Registry of Russian Firms. We should note that this 
approach can suffer from mis-classification basis. It can happen in those cases, when a 
firm, which is included in the registry, and is being involved into innovating activities, did 
not participate in the Goskomstat innovation survey. However, since the survey is quite 
large, we don’t think that the number of firms misclassified in this way is large. A similar 
specification can be estimated using IET survey data.   
  IET questioner allows us to estimate several other specifications. We can use the 
answer to the question about change in the rate of innovative activities since 1980s as a 
dependent variable. Additionally, we can test whether there are any differences in factors, 
which influence firms with imitating and innovating development strategies.   
  Methodology of constructing dependent variables also differs slightly in the case 
of Goskomstat and IET data.  In the case of Goskomstat data we have to rely on other 
sources, usually also produced by Goskomstat, to construct most of the variables. In the 
case of IET some of the variables can be obtained from other IET surveys, conducted   22
using the same original sample of firms.   
In addition to survey data and data from various Goskomstat publications, we use 
the so called Russian firms registry. This dataset contains firm level balance sheet statistics, 
and other statistical information, which Russian firms have to submit to statistical agencies. 
This dataset was constructed using information from GNOZIS, ALBA, Registry, and other 
datasets. These datasets are a traditional source of information on Russian firm, which was 
used in a number of other studies, among which are Yudaeva et al. (2003), Guriev and 
Rachinsky (2004), Brown and Earle (2001), etc. 
 
Variables construction in the case of Goskomstat survey 
 
There are two competition measures, which are included in the regression 
separately. Foreign competition is measured as a log of the ratio of import to total output 
of the firm’s 5-digit OKONH industry. Domestic competition is proxied by 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann concentration index in the 5-digit industry. Theory predicts that 
competition should have an inverted U-shape effect on innovations. To capture 
non-linearity of the effect, we also included in the regression the mean-subtracted square 
of the log of the import-output ratio. To measure domestic competition, we computed 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index for 5-digit OKONH industries and its square (also 
mean-subtracted). The index was constructed using data on firms’ production from the 
Registry of Russian firms. To escape reversed-causality interpretation, both measures of 
domestic and foreign competition were constructed for 1999. 
Several firms’ characteristics are used as explanatory variables – availability of 
own funds to finance innovations (sum of four dummies that equal one if the firm has 
positive profit in 1995-1998), size of the firm (log of average employment in 1996-1998), 
dummies for firms with foreign-ownership of more than 10% and firms with federal 
government ownership. All these variables are constructed using registry of Russian firms. 
The corporate governance index, which we use, was constructed by Guriev et al 
(2003) on the basis of the survey, which was also conducted by S. Tsukhlo. The survey 
included questions on relationships with minority shareholders, presence of external   23
directors, producing reports using international accounting standards and so on. The 
corporate governance index is the first principle component of all these measures. 
 
Variables construction in the case of the IET survey 
 
Instead of using Herfindahl-Hirschman index or import share as a measure of 
competition, in this model we are able to include as a right-hand side variable firms’ own 
assessment of the degree of competition it faces. Information on competition is a part of 
the regular IET surveys. The firms are asked to evaluate the level of competition using the 
four-score scale ranging from very strong (1 point) to none (4 points) for three groups of 
producers: domestic producers, producers from CIS countries, and producers from abroad. 
The index of competition intensity is constructed as the standardized inverted first 
principal component of firms’ assessment of competition with all three groups of 
competitors. That is, the higher is the size of the variable, the tougher is competition. 
Other firms’ characteristics are the same as in the regressions, which use 
Goskomstat data. In some specifications we also use indicator of those firms, whose 
managers studied abroad. This indicator is obtained from another survey, which we 
conducted together with the IET. That survey contained the question about firm having 
managers with foreign MBA, and the question about presence of managers, who took 
short management courses and/or internships abroad. Positive answer to one of these 
questions was coded as presence of managers, which studied abroad. Of course, we can 
not control for the quality of education, which such managers received, so this variable 
gives only an imprecise measure of the quality of managers. Nonetheless it turns out that 
inclusion of this variable in the regression equation provides interesting information about 
behavior of firms.   
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Results 
 
Tables 4 and 5 report the results of regression estimation in Goscomstat and IET 
datasets respectively. As can be seen from the regression tables, major results are in line 
with the theory. Profitability is highly significant in all specifications, estimated using 
Goskomstat sample. In the case of IET sample, this variable is also always positive, but it 
gets less significant or even insignificant in the specifications, where we control for 
quality of corporate governance, and quality of managers. Profitability here is a 
predetermined variable, and we interpret profitability as a measure of credit constraints. 
Our results suggest that credit constraints is an important obstacles to innovations. Better 
corporate governance can relax credit constraints. Ability of a firm to attract managers, 
educated abroad, or send managers abroad, can be a signal of firm profitability, so, again, 
it is not surprising that inclusion of this variable in the regression decreases significance of 
profitability itself. We should notice also that the size of the sample is smaller in all these 
two cases, which can be an alternative explanation for insignificance of profitability. 
In both datasets, when we compare firms, which innovate, with those, which do 
not innovate, size of the enterprise enters equations positively and significantly. This 
finding can have several explanations. Size of the firm can be another proxy for its credit 
constraints. Usually larger firms have better relationships with banks, which allows them 
to get credit. Large firms can also economize on scale, while doing R&D. Since we count 
not only large, but also small innovations, a technical explanation is also possible. Large 
enterprisers usually produce goods, which go through more stages of production, than the 
goods produced at smaller firms. Even if innovation rate in each stage of production is the 
same, the innovation rate on the large enterprise will be higher than on a small one. 
Interestingly, size of the enterprise does not matter when we look at the changes 
in innovation rate since 1980s. In a sense this regression controls for size fixed effect, 
which becomes unimportant. Imagine, however, that firms, which innovate more often, 
grow faster. Than the positive relationship between the firm size and change in innovation 
rate should be positive. Since we do not find such relationships, our results tend to suggest 
that innovation activities of Russian firms affect size distribution of firms very little, i.e.   25
that it is not necessarily true that firms with high innovation rate tend to increase their size, 
and slow innovators decrease their size. Absence of this effect can be explained either by 
the small size of most of innovations, or by ineffectiveness of most of innovations. It is 
also possible, that during most of the 1990s firms rarely innovated at all, and they only 
started to innovate recently. If this is the case, the size distribution of firms should change 
according to the intensiveness of innovation activities in the near future. 
The regressions on the IET dataset show that competition has an inverted U-shape 
effect on innovations.  This means that if competition is not severe, it actually forces 
firms to innovate. This effect is observed both in the comparison between different firms, 
and in the regressions, which looks on changes in innovation rate since 1980s. When we 
compare innovation rate across firms, the effect of competition gets insignificant in the 
specifications, where we control for the corporate governance quality, and for presence of 
managers, which received some training of education abroad. In both cases, when we 
include the quality of corporate governance, and education of managers, sample size is 
smaller than in the original specification. We estimated basic specifications on these 
smaller samples. Competition was insignificant already in this basic specification, so 
sample size explains most of the differences in the results.     
Goscomstat sample is much larger than the IET one, so we can control separately 
for the effect of domestic and foreign competition on innovations. Foreign competition we 
measure as competition with imports. The effects of both of them have a U-shape form.  
It means that there is a threshold in the intensity of competition, after which innovative 
activities become less intense. Since linear coefficient is positive and significant, and all 
measures of competition, which we use, are standardized variables, we can say that 
maximum of the parabola is to the right from the median firm, and majority of firms are 
on the upward-sloping part of parabola. In the smaller samples, where we control for 
quality of corporate governance, domestic competition, measures by Herfindahl index, 
becomes insignificant. 
On the Goscomstat dataset we can compare innovation rates of firms in different 
ownership. In the case of IET dataset this is impossible, because it contains almost no 
firms with high ownership stake, which belong either to the government or to the foreign   26
firms. Most of firms in this dataset are privately owned, and not traded on the stock 
exchange. In the Goskomstat, both enterprisers in foreign ownership and in federal 
government ownership turned out to innovate with higher probability than other 
enterprisers.    The former result differs from finding of Jefferson et al (2002a,b) regarding 
Chinese firms. That paper showed that foreign firms usually innovate less than the 
domestic ones. If they do innovate, though, they do it much more actively than the 
domestic firms. The Chinese paper concentrated more on R&D than on imitations. It 
interprets the finding regarding the foreign firms as if they rely more on innovations, made 
by the foreign investor. 
 Controlling for the quality of corporate governance and foreign education of 
managers produced positive, but insignificant results in all specifications in the IET 
samples. We did not run the regression with managers education on the Goskomstat 
sample, because this variable describes situation in 2003, while the information in the 
sample is relevant for 2001.   
As we will see, though, these variables have different effects on different types of 
innovation activities. Therefore, it is not surprising that their effect becomes insignificant, 
is we treat all innovation activities equally. 
 
Difference between innovations and imitations 
 
Table 6 reports probit estimates of determinants of innovations and imitations. In 
this specification, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the firm is involved in 
corresponding innovation activities, and equal to zero if it does not do innovations, or if it 
does innovations of another type. In Table 7 we report the results of multinominal logit 
estimation, where we divide all firms in three groups: those, which only innovate, those, 
which both innovate and imitate, and those, which only imitate. The qualitative results of 
both estimation techniques are quite similar. They demonstrate substantial differences in 
behavior of firms, involved in innovations and imitations. Both groups of firms innovate 
or imitate more often if they are larger. Other characteristics are correlated with imitations 
and innovations in a different way.     27
  Introduction of absolutely new products or technologies (innovations) is 
insensitive to profitability of the enterprise. The stimulating positive effect of competition 
is positive in this case, unless we control for corporate governance or foreign education of 
managers. Another variable, which is correlated with innovations is good corporate 
governance, while managerial education is insignificant.   
  The factors, which determine imitations, are slightly different. Imitations strongly 
positively and significantly depend on profitability of firms. Stimulating effect of 
competition on imitations is very strong in all specifications, while negative effect of very 
high competition gets insignificant in some specifications. Imitations are insensitive to 
quality of corporate governance. At the same time, the probability to imitate is strongly 
and positively correlated with the probability to have managers, educated abroad.   
  Probability to do both innovations and imitations is less dependent on 
profitability than probability to only imitate, and depends on competition stronger than 
both probabilities to only innovate or only imitate. This probability is strongly correlated 
with both education of managers and good corporate governance. 
  Columns 6 and 7 of Table XXXXX report results of the estimations, which relate 
probabilities to innovate, imitate, or to do both with probability to train personnel or 
conduct market studies. All three groups of firms rely on these two other activities 
significantly more often, than firms, which do not do product or technological innovations, 
or did not mark the answer about the type of innovation. The size of the coefficients at 
both variables is somewhat larger in the case of firms, which do both innovation and 
imitations. This latter finding can simply reflect the fact that such firms do more 
innovations. Imitating firms seem to conduct marketing studies slightly less often. Since 
many of them simply copy projects, which face high demand on the market, such studies 
may be unnecessary. 
  The finding that profitability is much stronger correlated with imitations than 
with innovations is a bit at odds with the theory. Usually, firms, which introduce 
absolutely new products are considered as more liquidity constraint than firms, which 
implement existing technologies. There are two possible explanations why the situation is 
different in the Russian case. The group of firms, which innovate, may include two types   28
of firms. The first type is “surviving” firms, which are not profitable. Such firms try to use 
their own resources to implement changes in technology and product range. Firms view 
these changes as introduction of absolutely new products or technologies, but the major 
goal of these innovations is simply to allow the firm to survive. These firms can’t afford 
sending their managers for training abroad or attract foreign educated managers, so this 
variable is insignificant in corresponding regressions. The second type is the enterprisers, 
which do innovations in the theoretical sense of the word. Since innovations require 
domestic human capital, which is cheaper than foreign human capital, this activity requires 
less investment than buying foreign technologies. Additionally, these are usually the firms 
with good corporate governance, which allows them to make credit constraint less strong, 
and to depend less on profitability. Interestingly, in Section 2, when we described firms’ 
answers to the question of obstacles to innovations, we noticed that firms, which 
introduced absolutely new products or technologies, complain about lack of external 
finance more often. In light of the regression results, this finding can be interpreted 
slightly differently. Firms, which introduce absolutely new products and technologies, pay 
more attention to relaxing credit constraints, and as a result care a lot about improvements 
in corporate governance. We suspect that a number of such firms conduct both innovations 
and imitations. This later group of firms also pays special attention to education of their 
managers and personnel.    Presence of “surviving” firms in the group of firms, which only 
conduct innovations, makes coefficient at the managerial education variable less 
significant. 
  The group of firms, which are involved only in imitations, follows 
“westernization strategy”. They upgrade their technological level and introduce product 
range, which is common to other firms and other countries. At the same time they attempt 
to improve their management, and with higher managers with western education, or, more 
often, educate their managers abroad on various training programs. Such strategy requires 
more resources than upgrading of production using domestic human capital, and 
innovation activities of such firms depend heavily on profitability. Competition seems to 
be the major driving force behind this process, although the effect of competition seems to 
be even stronger in the case of firms, which do both innovations and imitations.   29
Conclusions 
 
This paper reveals that Russian enterprisers follow two development strategies. 
“Westernization” strategy involves using retained earnings to implement products and 
technologies, which are actively used by other firms. Usually firms, which follow this 
strategy, pay special attention to educating their managers, or attracting managers, 
educated abroad. The second strategy involves relying on innovations, either developed by 
personnel of the firm, or outsourced to other organization. Such firms pay less attention to 
educating managers abroad. Instead they try to relax their budget constraints, and improve 
corporate governance. These two strategies are not mutually exclusive: there is a group of 
firms, which do both innovations and imitations.   
  Which of these two strategies produces better results in terms of increasing firms’ 
productivity, and reaching other goals, which firms try to achieve by getting involved in 
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Appendix 1 
Table 4. PROBIT regressions for Goskomstat sample 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Profit 1.81*** 1.79*** 1.79*** 1.89***  1.89*** 
   [13]  [13]  [13]  [3.72]  [3.70] 
Employment 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.52***  0.50*** 
   [26]  [25]  [26]  [7.71]  [7.01] 
Import share  0.67*** 0.68*** 0.66*** 0.89***  0.90*** 
    [9.7] [9.8] [9.6] [3.38]  [3.41] 
Import share squared  -0.85*** -0.85*** -0.84*** -0.87*  -0.87* 
    [6.2] [6.2] [6.1] [1.71]  [1.71] 
Herfindahl index  0.45*** 0.43**  0.44*** 0.21  0.25 
    [2.66] [2.52] [2.58] [0.34] [0.41] 
Herfindahl index squared  -1.74*** -1.70*** -1.78*** -2.75  -2.57 
  [2.80] [2.74] [2.86] [1.28] [1.22] 
Foreign ownership    0.26**      
     [2.55]      
State ownership      0.10**    
       [2.08]    
Oligarch-controlled       
       
Corporate  governance  index       0.05 
       [ 0 . 8 5 ]  
Observations  10816 10816 10816  505  505 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 5. PROBIT regressions for IET sample 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
  All innovations  Changes in innovations 
Profit  1.19   6.23  0.88   0.80   0.96  0.73  
   [2.8]***  [1.81]*  [1.6] [2.1]**  [0.82]  [1.6] 
Employment  0.28   0.37  0.43   0   -0.26  0  
 [4.1]***  [1.09]  [4.6]***  [0.1]  [1.50]  [0.3] 
Competition  0.17   0.03  0.18   0.13   0.14  0.09  
   [2.4]***  [0.05]  [2.2]** [2.0]**  [0.60]  [1.2] 
Competition^2 -0.18  -0.3  -0.20  -0.18  -0.05  -0.11 















     [0.4]      [1.4] 
Observations 456  299  346  456  299  346 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   33
Table 6:   
Differences between innovations and imitations in the IET sample. Simple PROBIT. 
 [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]  [6] 
 Innovations  Imitations 
Profit  -0.33   0.27  -0.91   1.27   2.5  1.63  
   [0.9]  [0.24]  [2.0]*  [3.2]*** [1.85]*  [3.1]*** 
Employment  0.22   0.34  0.24   0.10  0.32  0.17  
 [3.9]***  [1.98]**  [3.5]***  [1.8]**  [1.71]*  [2.5]** 
Competition  0.17   0.34  0.12   0.22   0.05  0.19  
   [2.7]***  [1.40]  [1.7]  [3.4]*** [0.20]  [2.5]** 
Competition^2  -0.06  0.13  -0.05   -0.10  -0.34  -0.07  
















     [0.9]      [2.1]** 
Observations 456  299  346  456  299  346 
Absolute value of z statistics in brackets   
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  34
Table 7. Differences between innovations and imitations in the IET sample. 
Multinomial LOGIT regressions.   
No innovations or imitations as base category.   
Inno- Imita- Inno- Imita- Inno- Imita-
vations tions vations tions vations tions
Profit -0.75 1.65 1.93 -1.9 1.3 2.26 -1.08 0.99 0.86
[0.95] [1.69]* [2.33]** [1.92]* [1.02] [1.99]** [0.99] [0.81] [0.88]
Employme 0.43 0.52 0.22 0.52 0.69 0.39 0.35 0.49 0.16
[3.32]*** [3.90]*** [1.91]* [3.12]*** [4.08]*** [2.58]*** [1.85]* [2.63]*** [1.03]
Competi-
tion 0.31 0.62 0.37 0.24 0.5 0.33 0.32 0.46 0.45
[2.17]** [3.89]*** [2.88]*** [1.47] [2.70]*** [2.21]** [1.57] [2.20]** [2.65]***
Competi-
tion^2 -0.13 -0.24 -0.19 -0.07 -0.2 -0.11 -0.08 -0.28 -0.09
[1.07] [1.80]* [1.66]* [0.50] [1.26] [0.84] [0.43] [1.45] [0.57]
Managers
educated




index 0.46 0.37 0.13
[2.85]*** [2.35]** [1.04]
Observa-




Inno- Imita- Inno- Imita-
vations tions vations tions
Profit -0.86 1.17 1.73 -0.86 1.35 1.9
[1.06] [1.20] [2.02]** [1.08] [1.35] [2.27]**
Employment 0.36 0.39 0.15 0.4 0.5 0.2
[2.72]*** [2.80]*** [1.31] [3.12]*** [3.60]*** [1.76]*
Competition 0.25 0.52 0.33 0.27 0.54 0.35
[1.75]* [3.16]*** [2.48]** [1.87]* [3.30]*** [2.71]***
Competition^ -0.14 -0.26 -0.2 -0.1 -0.17 -0.17
[1.15] [1.87]* [1.76]* [0.80] [1.23] [1.51]
Personnel
training 1.26 2.08 1.19
[3.83]*** [6.21]*** [3.92]***
Marketing
studies 1.11 1.82 0.69
[3.14]*** [5.28]*** [2.05]**




Absolute value of z statistics in brackets   











IET dataset, dependent variables: 
•  Innovations – indicator of a firm answering positively on any question of types of 
innovations 
•  Change in innovations – indicator of a firm answering positively on question of 
whether innovation activity on the enterprise is higher than in Soviet times (pre 
1980) 
•  New innovations - indicator of a firm answering positively on whether innovations 
are absolutely new 
•  Imitations - indicator of a firm answering positively on whether innovations are 
copies of existing technologies 
•  Type of innovations (multinomial) – 4 categories: no innovations, only new, only 
imitations, both kinds 
 
IET dataset, independent variables: 
•  Competition – principal component of average of firms estimate of intensity of 
competition they are facing across three categories: competition with home 
producers, competition with CIS producers, and competition with foreign 
producers. 
•  Profitability –    % of profit in sales, averaged through 1998-2001 
•  Employment – log employment in 2001 
 
Goskomstat dataset, dependent variable: 
•  Innovation - indicator of a firm being in the list of innovators, with the name of 
innovation given 
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Goskomstat dataset, independent variables: 
•  Concentration – Herfindahl-Hirschmann index for 5-digit OKONH industries 
•  Import penetration – share of imported commodities on the market for firm’s output. 
Constructed from GNOZIS data about real commodity output of Russian 
enterprises, and database on Russian international trade. 
•  Profitability – % of profit in sales, averaged through 1996-1999. 
•  Employment – log employment in 1999 
 
Common independent variables: 
•  orporate governance index – constructed in Guriev, Rachinsky(2004) as an average 
of several indicators of good corporate governance practices 
•  Managers studied abroad – indicator of positive answer to questions about whever 
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Table 8. Sample summary statistics   
  IET sample  Goskomstat 
sample 
Dependant 
variable  All innovations  Change in 
innovations 
Absolutely 
new  Buy or copy  All innovations
  0  1   010101  0  1
Firms  91 395  305 181 297 189 250 236  9748  1062 
         
Mean avg. 
profit/sales  -0.1% 7.1%  4.4% 7.9% 5.8% 5.6% 2.9% 8.7%  2.6% 10.1%
Median avg. 
profit/sales  2.3% 7.2%  5.4% 8.5% 6.4% 6.5% 4.7% 8.4%  5.1% 10.5%
               
Mean 
employment  734 1471  1357 1292 1031 1808 1149 1528 431  1806 
Median 
employment  349 704  559 702 521 757 503 688  170 635 
 
Table 9. Description of the samples of firms, where there is information on oligarchs 
ownership. 
 Innovators  (IET)  Innovators (Goskomstat) 
 No  Yes  No  Yes 
Oligarch-controlled 47  35  260  118 














II. Competitiveness of Small Enterprises: 
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Competitiveness of Small Enterprises: Evidence from Empirical 
Survey in Two Russian Regions 
 
Victoria Golikova and Galina Ermilova 
 
During the last decade a number of extensive research on SME development was 
implemented in Russia by the research and analytical centers, different international funds 
and institutions. Some of them were focused on the monitoring of the business climate for 
the development of the SME sector1. As usual, they covered more or less similar topics of 
institutional environment and evaluation of its impact on the strategies of behavior of SE or 
its particular segments – start-ups, innovative firms, etc. 
 
Small business development, number of entities  
Official Rosstat statistics 
 
FFFFFF
SE SE SE SE SE SE
IE IE IE IE IE IE
6 125 5 951 5 863 5 602
5 378
5 027
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  
 
IE    – individual entrepreneurs; SE –small enterprises – legal entities; F- farmers 
                                                      
1 See, for example, the 2001 OECD survey of small business – OECD Economic Surveys. Russian 
Federation – Volume 2002/5 – February, pp. 73-105; T.Afanasieva, V.Buev, T.Pudenko. Analysis of the 
Institutional Environment for Small Business Entrepreneurship - Moscow, Business-Thezaurus, 2005,  198 
pages (in Russian).     41
Both official statistics and survey data provide some evidence about very few 
positive changes in the development of Russian SE sector: Small business sector since 
revival after 1998 financial crisis is growing very slow, number of SE in R&D is 
decreasing, share of informal activities is still very high.   
Barriers and obstacles, inhospitable climate for entrepreneurship prevent the 
successful SEs to grow and strengthen positions in the competition on the Russian and 
international markets. High disparity between regions in terms of SE development still 
remains ranging from capital regions (Moscow and St-Petersburg where the level of SE 
development is comparable with EU countries) to regions with very modest and less 
significant impact of SE sector to the regional economy. These facts provide clear evidence 
of unfavorable tendencies in the development of Russia SE sector as a whole. Without any 
doubt, we can establish a fact that state policy on SE development, including quantity and 
allocation of financial resources, still didn’t create enough incentives for transforming 
existing trajectory of small business development to more intensive one. 
The aim of this survey
2was to evaluate climate for SEs development and assess key 
factors of SE competitiveness, formulate recommendations on the state economic policy 
measures that can contribute to  strengthening the incentives for its development and 
competitiveness on the domestic and global markets.   
Background and methodology. As the survey of SEs was a part of the project 
including medium and large firms in manufacturing industry empirical data on SEs should 
provide an opportunity for proper benchmarking with the enterprises of larger size groups 
and include the same types of economic activities and a set of similar questions for 
evaluation of climate, performance and markets. Besides, specifics of small 
entrepreneurship, which depends on the regional and local environment more than the 
enterprises of larger size, shouldn’t be forgotten and taken into consideration
3. Specific 
                                                      
*Survey was implemented in Autumn 2005 within the framework of State University – Higher School of 
Economics (Russia, Moscow) Project with the participation of the World Bank. 
2  We didn’t include start-up firms as a subject of research as this group has specific problems during first two 
years 
3 See the results of large World bank survey (sample – 3, 500 respondents of large, medium and small 
enterprises) in 7 regions of Russia in 2003-2004 - http://www.worldbank.org.ru). 
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character of the subject of the research imposes the limitations on the survey tools. First of 
all, share of informal activities in small business and lack of respondent’ desire to provide 
true information about performance (sales, profits, salaries). It’s a well known fact that 
more or less reliable information collected in the surveys of small business sector in the 
transitional economies is number of employees. Keeping in mind a possibility to obtain a 
lot of refuses to answer performance data we included in the questionnaire different 
qualitative questions that gave an opportunity to research the financial position of the firm 
from different points of view. 
Respondent in this survey – is a general manager or owner f the firm as the most 
informed persons. The surveying company conducted face-to-face  interviews with the 
questionnaire tested beforehand on the limited number of firms. The questionnaire was 
sufficiently improved after piloting. 
The questionnaire included mainly qualitative estimations of market segment, 
demand, business climate, competition, strategy of market behavior, evaluation of state 
policy for SEs and a limited number of quantitative questions about firm performance in 
2003-2004. It covered following general topics: 
•  General information about the firm and business of the owner, including incentives 
to work as a SE entrepreneur; 
•  Markets where the firm is operating, relations with suppliers and clients 
•  Financing and investment 
•  Business environment for small entrepreneurship on the municipal, regional (oblast) 
and federal level 
•  Evaluation of state policy on SE development, relations between businesses and 
authorities 
•  Participation in business associations 
•  Labor relations and employment  
Research methods used in the analysis of survey data include comparison of means 
in grouped data, cross-tabulation analysis for the whole and regional samples and data 
grouped by types of economic activity and other grouping criteria, main components’ and 
regression analysis.     43
Main research hypothesis tested in the survey: 
 
1. Initial incentives to become a small business entrepreneur are of particular 
importance for future success in small business. Firms organized by active, risky and 
innovative persons have in general more chances to become sustainable and grow than the 
firms organized by people who had no other opportunities for employment. 
 2. High transaction costs prevent SE to grow. As a result a sufficient number of 
small firms operate as a network of firms of one owner. Such practice is a compensatory 
mechanism in unfavorable business environment. We expect that the subjective evaluations 
of business climate will depend on status of small firm – either autonomous (out of 
network) or network firm. Being more protected by inside mechanism of redistribution of 
resources and risks network firms will demonstrate better evaluations of business climate 
than the autonomous firms. 
3. Main problems of SE development are similar to the problems of medium and 
large enterprises but they are more sensitive to small business entrepreneurs. We expect 
that evaluations of business climate in small business will be in general more critical.   
4. Despite the fact that the number of administrative barriers in small business is 
decreasing their level is still rather high. As a result high transaction costs have a negative 
impact on the competitiveness of SEs. Rent of premises, obtaining and registration of lots 
and permits for construction are treated are expected to be the most serious problems for 
small business entrepreneurs. 
5. Corruption and extorting money could be found in every sphere of small business. 
They provoke shadow activities as a financial resource to deal with the state bureaucrats. 
Small firms are less protected from extorting and aggression and have to carry more safety 
costs (measured as % to sales) in comparison with medium and large enterprises. 
6. Attitude of small businesses towards state policy on support of SEs depends on 
the practice of every day communications with state officials. Negative practice of relations 
between state and small business entrepreneurs causes negative evaluation of state policy 
on SEs. 
7. Access to finance is one of the main factors with a negative impact on current   44
competitiveness of small firms and an obstacle for their potential to grow and compete in 
future. 
8. Access of SEs to the market of state contracts is hampered  due to lack of 
regulations in this area oriented on SEs. Market of state contracts has no sufficient impact 
on the competitiveness of SEs.   
9. Cooperation of SEs with large Russian enterprises, foreign and international 
companies has a positive impact on their competitiveness due to higher standards of 
production, delivery, services, etc. 
10. SEs in niche segments are more competitive than the producers of standard 
products and services. 
 
Sample design: 
The survey of SEs was designed as a pilot one. Due to the financial constraints of the 
research it was a priori decided that the sample of SE couldn’t be more than 300 firms as 
the main focus of the whole project was on the competitiveness of medium and large 
enterprises. This sample size, of course, is too limited to be representative for the whole 
Russia economy where 953,1 thousand of SEs operate (Official statistics data on the 1
st of 
January, 2005). As usual, SME surveys in Russia have significant regional sub samples 
providing an opportunity to examine regional differences in the economic environment and 
its influence on firm’s performance. The only way out was to implement survey in a very 
limited number of regions, taking one from the capital regions (Moscow or St.Petersburg) 
and one from less developed. The criteria for the selection of regions were SE intensity. So, 
three subjects of Federation were chosen for this survey - St.-Petersburg, Leningradskaya 
and Sverdlovskaya oblast.   
 
For the purpose of this research two main types of economic activity were selected 
– manufacturing and services. The whole sample was divided into two equal sub samples 
for manufacturing and services (150 firms) with equal strata for each OKVED subsection 
(30 firms).   45
To provide the comparability with the survey results of medium and large firms in 
manufacturing the following types of economic activities were selected: food processing, 
excluding tobacco; textile and apparel; wood processing; chemicals production; metal and 
metal ware production; machinery, excluding arms and ammunition production; electrical, 
electronic and optical equipment; vehicle and parts. In services we included different types 
of activities - both for population and business in order to examine their growth potential: 
firms operating with real property, dealing with computer equipment and information 
technologies, R & D, B2B (law, accounting and audit, business and management) and 
personal services (laundering, dry-cleaning, dyeing, hairdressing, fitness, beauty activities, 
etc). According to Russian official statistics’ criteria of SEs the manufacturing firms are the 
firms with less than 100 employees, in R&D – less than 60 employees and in services – 
less than 50 employees. 
The sample is representative for the selected regions with probability 0, 683 for 
salaries and number of employees and is not representative for sales due to heterogeneity 
and misrepresentation of data. The sample is representative for each region with probability 
0,954 for qualitative evaluations of financial position of the firm and profitability. 
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Distribution of SE surveyed by type of 










Distribution of SE surveyed by status of the 
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Distribution of SE surveyed by size 
(number of employees) 









Trends of SE development in selected regions (by official data): 
Selected regions represent clusters with different level of SE development in 
terms of SE intensity by 1000 persons of active population, share of SEs in sales and share 
in total employment in the region. In the framework of these indicators Saint-Petersburg 
(together with Moscow as capital cities) represents regions-leaders, Leningradskaya oblast 
is a member of the largest (49 regions) cluster with rather high level of indicators and 
Sverdlovskaya oblast represents a cluster with a medium level of SE input in regional 
economy.  
Among the regions surveyed the largest number of SEs is in Saint Petersburg. It is 
typical for this city (often called as a second capital of Russia) that the number SEs is 
comparable to the number of individual entrepreneurs, who are a part of small business 
sector. In Sverdlovskaya oblast small business sector mainly consists of the individual 
entrepreneurs. Different structure of small business sector is connected with the level of 
regional socio-economic development: the higher level of living and employment the more 
share of SEs (as a larger form of entity) in the structure of the sector. Segment of individual 
entrepreneurship as usual provides mainly self-employment and is a tool to gain a modest 





In 2001-2004 small business sector grew. All the regions are comparable in terms of 
SE intensity with more or less equal intensity of subjects of small business   50
entrepreneurship per 1000 of population. High intensity of the analyzed indicator in 
Leningradskaya and Sverdlovskaya oblast were caused by the broad development of 
individual entrepreneurship.  
Employment in small business also tended to grow: at the end of 2004 968, 000 jobs 
in Saint-Petersburg were in small business sector (41% as a share in total employment), in 
Sverdlovskaya oblast – 601, 000 jobs (29%), in Leningradskaya oblast – 278, 000 jobs 
(39%).    Share of small business sector in employment in the selected regions: 
 
 
Main survey results: 
How we can evaluate firm performance and competitiveness in small business? The 
main indicator to estimate performance and competitiveness in small business is annual 
sales. We need this indicator to calculate value added, profits, productivity as value added 
per one employee. Unfortunately, about 30% of respondent refused to answer the question 
about their sales in 2003 and 2004. Those who gave this information often distorted the 
data
4. For analytical purposes we can use the performance information only from 65% of 
                                                      
4 For instance checked the reliability of data by the estimating of annual salaries. Often they are higher than   51
respondents (and the quality of this information is not very reliable). 
Subjective (qualitative) information on the financial position of the firm was given 
by the whole sample of respondents. In order to assess the possibility to use qualitative 
evaluations instead of objective (or so-called objective) data we estimate the statistical 
significance of means (growth of sales
5, profitability, productivity as sales per one 
employee and value added per one employee). 
Evidence from the survey  proves that the correlation between qualitative 
evaluations and growth of sales and profitability is rather high, so we used these 
evaluations as more or less reliable and adequate indicators of small firms’ 
competitiveness.  
 
Financial position of SEs: 
In general financial position of SEs surveyed in 2004 and 2005 was the same – 1/3 
of firms consider it “good” or “very good”, a little bit more than 50% - “satisfactory” and 
less than 10% as “bad” or “very bad”. About ¼ of SE could be treated as sustainable in 
good position, half of the firms are sustainable in satisfactory position. About 20% of firms 
firm are in unstable position. Almost half of them demonstrate positive dynamics and the 
same number – negative, 3% of SEs are almost bankrupts. These performance results are 
not surprising as small firms development follows the market demand.   
Increasing demand is followed in 2005 by the increasing share of firms in good 
financial position: the ratio of firms in good and satisfactory position rises from 0, 64 to 
0,86. 
As for 2004 the distribution of firms by the financial position was the same in the 
regions surveyed. According to the respondents’ responses in 2005 small businesses in 
Sverdlovskaya oblast felt better than in Leningradskaya oblast: share of firms in good 
position was 14,2 points higher than in Leningradskaya oblast (statistical significance 
0,018). Accordingly, the share of firms in bad position was in Leningradskaya oblast 4,5 
points higher. These different evaluations in the regions were caused mainly by worsened 
                                                                                                                                                                 
sales.  
5  Deflator GDP for production and services.   52
positions of small firms in Saint Petersburg, where the level of competition is much more 
higher.  
 
Evaluation of the financial position of the firm 
(% of the respondents, whole sample) 
Stable unsuccessful 




Firms with positive 
dynamics of financial 
position in 2004-2005
9%
Firms with negative 
dynamics of financial 
position in 2004-2005
11% stable and successful 
(financial position in 



























Cross-tabulation  of market demand evaluations and financial 
position of the firm  (2004,2005)   (% of respondents)
Good Satisfactory or bad 
 
 
In 2004-2005 SEs in services in general feel better than firms in production (the 
share of successful firms is 1/3 and ¼, accordingly). The sustainability of firms in services 
2005
2004  53
is also better than in production (the statistical significance of differences is 0,023- 0,039).     
Good and sustainable performance correlated with the specialization of SEs on the 
niche products. This business strategy in small business appears to be much more 
successful than production of standard products and services that requires low costs and 
scaly economy. The share of “good” performers in niche segment is 13,4 points higher than 
in the other group (statistical significance 0, 012). Competitive advantages of small firms in 
niche segments are based mainly on in unique capabilities of employees being very 











Market segments and evaluation 
of financial position of SE
Good Satisfactory and bad
 
 
How could be the competitiveness of SEs evaluated? We consider that stable good 
position of the firm on the market may be considered as an indirect indicator of its 
competitiveness. Comparison of consistency of objective and subjective criteria gave good 
results and proved the possibility to use survey data instead of reported official statistics.   
Grouping the firms by their competitiveness was made using the following 
procedure: two groups were excluded from the initial sample: first, firms in unstable 
position (both worsening and improving) during last two years and, second, the group with 
very bad financial position due to the small size of this group for analysis (9 firms).   
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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% 140%
Good or very good
Satisfactory
Bad or very bad
Whole sample
Growth of sales in  2004 г. (2003г. = 100%) 
in groups with different financial position
2004 г. 2003 г.
 
 
04 7 28,9 24,1
3,3 68,9 23,3 4,4
20 73,3 6,7 0
3,2 62,6 24,1 10,1





Profitablity of firms with different financial position, 
% of firms
with losses less than 10% 10-20% more than 20%
 
 
What kind of firms is in general more competitive? Share of competitive SEs 
differs in production and services. Regional differences are also important. Besides, the 
following factors have a significant role in the distribution of shares of    “competitive” and 
“less competitive” firms:   
•  State contracts (statistical significance 0,022)
6 
•  Contracts with foreign (international) companies (0,029)     
                                                      
6  Initial hypothesis was insignificant role of state contracts. The empirical results didn’t prove it.   55
•  Training costs per employee (0,059)
7.  
No difference was found testing groups by size of SEs (measured by number of 
employees); export activities (fact of export), contracts with large Russian enterprises, and 






0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Entrepreneurs with no other opportunities
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Analysis of survey data provides evidence about the significance of the incentives 
to become small business entrepreneur and correlation of the incentives and probability to 
create a successful and sustainable business. We found out that the share of “good” 
performers and more competitive firms is higher in the groups of creative, active 
entrepreneurs (“opportunity”) and innovators. The group that had chosen small business 
entrepreneurship without any other possibilities for employment was less successful in 
their career as an owner and manager of small firm (the difference between the share of 
competitive firms in these groups was statistically significant in 2004 (0,026), and the same 
tendency was demonstrated in 2005). The “innovators” and “opportunity” entrepreneurs 
more often were the contractors of foreign companies, implemented state contracts. They 
were more active in exporting (share of exporters was 23, 9%- two times higher than for 
                                                      
7 To compare the means non-parametric test to compare is used. The open question is the direction of this 
correlation – probably, firms in good financial position have a possibility to invest in training and bad 
performers – not.     56
the whole sample and 3-4 times higher than was typical for another group). They had more 
investment in R&D too. 
Access to finance was another significant factor with a negative impact on the 
competitiveness of SEs. Limited market of financial services for small business both 
available from traditional banking sector and non-banking institutions is an obstacle to 
grow. The majority of entrepreneurs used to invest only their own capital and consider not 
realistic and risky to attract external financial resources for the growth of business. This 
was one of the reasons why in 2004 about half of the firms surveyed complained about 
complicated access to finance and only ¼ of them applied for bank credit. Besides this 
paradox the collateral, insurance and evaluation of real estate as a collateral are still 
problematic for small firms. In case of financial difficulties and the necessity to obtain 
outside finance the most popular solution for half of SEs was partner’s credit or loans from 
other entrepreneurs. During last years the situation with availability of bank credit began to 
improve: banks are looking for new markets and clients, trying to diversify their portfolio 
and micro-finance institutions became more active in some regions.   
We have made an attempt to develop a model of competitiveness of SEs using the 
indicator of productivity (sales per employee) as a dependant variable and for predictors - 
gross regional product evaluated per active population in the region (indicator of regional 
economic development) and number of all credit institutions in the region.   
The model looks like   
C = 1751, 6*N + 22.3GRP + 523480,7 
Where 
C -  Competitiveness  of  SE,  estimated as productivity (sales per employee) 
N  -  Number of credit institutions in the region 
GRP  -  Gross regional product, evaluated per active population 
 
Evaluation of business environment for SEs   
 
Business climate in the regions is one of key factors of SE competitiveness on the 
market. Costs for doing business should allow the economic agents to grow and develop.   57
Correlations between respondents’ estimations of business climate and their performance 
data proved this statement.   
From last 90-s state authorities declared the policy of decreasing administrative 
burden on businesses. Both official statistics and results of surveys’ data provide evidence 
about some positive changes in the implementation of this policy
8. But still remain a lot of 
problems to be resolved. In our survey only 1/3 of the respondents considered business 
climate to be favorable for doing business. By the opinion of more than half of the 
entrepreneurs during last two years the situation didn’t change to the best. We should stress 
the fact that half of the firms with good financial position and growing demand, i.e. quite 
competitive firms, evaluated the business climate negatively.   
We found out very weak correlation, practically lack of difference between the 
business climate evaluations in the regions surveyed. These results demonstrate that the 
problem of better conditions for SEs is more general problem of the Russia economy than 
the regional one
9. 
A quarter of differences in the evaluation of business climate could be explained by 
the respondents’ estimations of corruption, state policy for small business entrepreneurship 
and consistency of reforms, i.e. by macroeconomic factors. But this result doesn’t mean at 
all that the problems of SEs could and should be resolved on the federal level. Keeping in 
mind local markets where most of the SEs operate, the local specifics of their problems, 
poor lobbying opportunities due to very low participation in the business associations most 
of the problems of small firms are in competence of municipal authorities
10  
In our survey the respondents evaluated each of the 19 components of business 
climate that in sum explain half of the differences in the general evaluation of business 
climate.
11
                                                      
8 Positive changes in decreasing of administrative procedures are mainly connected with simplified 
procedure of registration, reducing number of activities with obligatory licenses, the procedure of obligatory 
certification is abolished, inspections and control procedures were more strictly regulated.   
9  Regional differences also were not revealed in one of the most recent surveys in 6 Russia regions.   
10  24% of respondents participate in business associations. 
11 Determination  coefficient  –  47%.   58
Business climate evaluation by the respondents   
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Uncertainty of state regulation was considered to be a serious problem by half of 
the respondents in both regions. Besides lack of understandable policy for the development 
of small entrepreneurship a lot of complaints was about level of taxes and tax 
administration, availability of credits, lack of qualified workers and corruption. Neither 
type of economic activity and firm size, no firm’ age on the market, location in the oblast 
center or in province were significant for evaluations of business climate components.   
According to the results of main components’ analysis better macroeconomic 
conditions could change the opinion of quarter entrepreneurs about business climate; 10% 
of differences in the evaluation could be explained by infrastructure factor and 8% - by the 
problems in the regulations of lots. The input of other factors (labor relations, access to 
finance, region) contributes to the explanation of only 17% of differences.   
One of the sharpest problems of business climate is corruption. . In general, 
corruption was the main factor in explanation of the general evaluation of business climate. 
Survey data analysis proved that presence of corruption influenced all the evaluations of 
business climate. The input of corruption factor was stronger in the evaluation of tax 
administration and safety of business, competition, and consistency in state policy, quality 
of law enforcement
12. Problems in law enforcement also correlated with evidence of 
informal relations in small business. It’s worth to stress that: 
•  There was no difference in evaluation of corruption between SEs grouped 
by different criteria used in this survey, so, we could suggest that it was a 
common burden for all types of small businesses; 
•  informal payments became a common practice of doing business (only 10% 
of respondents managed to avoid informal payments dealing with 
administrative procedures). Business community considers such behavior 
as “normal» and the only possible practice. That is why corruption itself as 
a serious problem was chosen in ranking of the gravest problems only by 
4% of SEs.   
The evidence of corruption was stronger in the procedures of obtaining lots and 
                                                      
12  Correlations between corruption and evaluation of business climate components are in Annex 1.   60
permits for construction (about 70% of respondents mentioned it)
13. These results are 
understandable due to the fact these procedures are the most complicated and less clear in 
terms of regulation.   
Being pressed to carry serious burdens on safety of business corruption is becoming 
a factor of sufficient negative impact on the firms’ competitiveness (not only in the small 
business). Half of the firms responded that they had extracted about $1400 from their 
turnover to provide safety of work. The more size of firm - the more costs for securing 
safety of business measured not only in terms of average sum extracted from business but 




15  in small business – a tool to deal with institutional problems of small 
entrepreneurship 
 
Since the end of 90s - beginning of 2000s we monitor in empirical surveys of Sees 
an interesting phenomena in the business strategy of small businesses: about 30% 
entrepreneurs prefer to create a network of small firms instead of growing and becoming a 
medium size business. First time we revealed the scale of network development in small 
business in OECD survey implemented in 2001 in three Russian regions where 33,4% of 
respondents told that they managed more than one small firm 
16. Practically the same 
results were obtained in our survey in 2005.   
Quantitative estimations of networking firms are the same in both regions, in the 
oblast center and in province. So, we could propose that this type of business strategy is 
common for Russian small business entrepreneurship as a whole. 
Basic characteristics of network firms were the following. First, they were larger 
than autonomous ones (the share of micro- firms is 2 times less, the share of companies 
with 11-50 employees is 12,8 points higher and the share of firms with more than 50 
                                                      
13 We considers the respondents’ answer on the question about existence of informal payments “difficult to 
say” to be very similar to answer “yes”. 
14 Correlation coefficient between number of employees and costs to secure safety is 0,228 (statistical 
significance 0, 01). 
15  Network of SEs here is a number of small firms managed by one owner.   
16  The sample was 303 firms in Irkutskaya, Tulskaya oblast and Udmurtia.   61
employees is 4 points higher in the network firms, statistical difference – 0,067). Second, 
network firms were more profitable. Profitability of 10-20% in 2004 had 28,6% of network 
firms (23, 5% of autonomous); profitability more than 20% had 14,3% network firms and 
6,7 of autonomous. The share of exporters in network firms was higher (20,4% and 7,6%, 
correspondingly, statistical significance 0,026). Among them the share of companies 
gaining from export more than 5% of sales was also higher (12,2% and 4,3%, 
correspondingly, statistical significance 0,08). 
Network companies were more active in investment and innovations. For example, 
R&D investment in 2004 was done by half (51,9%) of network firms and by 29,0% of 
autonomous firms (statistical significance 0,004). They more often obtained bank credits 
and invested in training. 
So, we have enough reasons to consider that network firms are at the moment the 
most successful companies with a good growth potential to become a medium business. 
They prefer to develop as network firms due to unfavorable institutional environment. To 
be larger now means to be more noticeable and to carry additional costs, first of all – for 
securing safety.   
We tested the hypothesis that networking in small business was a compensatory 
mechanism to deal with institutional problems and found out that among networking firms 
about 30% were satisfied with business climate (compared to 20% of autonomous firms), 
correspondingly, the share of firms with negative estimations was 12,7 points less 
(statistical significance - 0,091). So, In general, they were less sensitive to macroeconomic 
instability.  In turn, they evaluated more negatively the possibility of obtaining and 
registration of lots, customs procedures and unfair competition (statistical significance of 
difference was 0.047-0,068). 
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1.  Due to lack or reliable statistical information about financial performance of small firms 
substitute indicators were used in the analysis of SE performance. The survey provides 
evidence that subjective evaluations of financial position could be used instead of 
performance data as they reflect correctly profitability of business and growth of sales.   
2.  In general, the amount of competitive firms (assessed as a share of firms with stable 
good position on the market during last two years) was approximately 25%. 
3.  In 2005 regional differences in the competitiveness of small firms become significant. 
They follow the growth of demand and reflect the level of competition on the markets. 
4.  Small firms in services were, in general, more competitive than in production. The 
position of firms in production was worsening; the share of firms with grave financial 
problems was growing. 
5.  The business climate for small entrepreneurship is still unfavorable. One of the most 
serious problems is the burden of corruption, which became a business routine and is 
treated by the entrepreneurs as a common practice. 
6.  In the framework of unfavorable conditions a noticeable part of entrepreneurs (about 
30% respondents in the whole sample) choose network artificial duplicating of small   63
firms instead of legal growing to medium business. Being more innovative, active in 
investment and training these firms could contribute to the growth of Russian economy. 
More active and targeted state policy towards medium enterprises is needed. 
7.  Among internal factors with a significant influence on differentiation of firms by the 
level of their competitiveness are: 
•  Positioning on the market (more successful business strategy for SEs was 
specialization on niche markets) 
•  State contracts. 
•  Contracts with international companies, including located in Russia 
•  Training costs per employee. 
8.  The survey proved hypothesis about the correlation between the incentives to be a small 
business entrepreneur and probability to create an effective business: the chances of 
innovative entrepreneurs and «opportunity” entrepreneurs  were higher than the 
chances of entrepreneurs without any other possibility to find a job.   
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Recent Development of Corporate Finance 






In this paper, we will try to throw light upon corporate finance mechanisms in 
transition economies, with particular emphasis being paid to Russia.  To this effect, it 
would be indispensable to have access to micro-financial data of a particular company.  
However, this is not necessarily easy to obtain.  We will therefore approach the issue 
using data already currently available.     
Research on corporate finance is broadly done in the western market economy.  
The main method used for such research is quantitative research based on the accounting 
reports of individual firms.  Company accounting reports offer, in a comparable form, an 
objective view of corporate activities.  Furthermore, they reflect the most fundamental 
state of a company at any given time.  Generally speaking, a company manufactures and 
sells goods and services.    Corporate finance analysis hence deals mainly with the financial 
side of the sale of goods and services.  If  we  consider  the  financial flow corresponding to 
the process of supply and transformation of raw materials, and the sale of goods, we see 
that there are a number of processes involved. These include the financing and mobilization 
of funds, and the distribution of what is obtained from the sale of products.    It is necessary 
for us to analyze these processes.   
A company’s situation varies greatly depending on the scale of its activities and 
the business areas in which it works.  However, we can uncover certain features of 
corporate finance when this is evaluated on a macro-level.  Such macro-features can be 
regarded as being the corporate finance mechanisms of any given country.  A company’s 
                                                      
† This article was prepared for Japanese-Hungarian Workshop on „Corporate Finance an Governance in 
Eastern and Central Eastern Europe,” which was organized and held on 19 July, 2005, by the Institute of 
Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.  The author would like to show his gratitude to Prof. Iván 
Bélyácz for his valuable comments.  
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activities are conditioned by various factors and contexts.  Therefore, corporate finance 
mechanisms vary from country to country.  The ultimate aim of our research here is to 
compare these mechanisms in transition economies, and to obtain a deeper understanding 
of the overall process of transformation.   
We would like to consider here numerous factors which affect the formation of 
corporate finance mechanisms.  These are all factors which regulate corporate activities.  
Of particular importance are the fiscal and financial systems in use (including taxation 
systems) and the development of the financial sector (banks, the regulating environment of 
capital markets etc.).  Furthermore, macroeconomic conditions, financial policies, 
dividend policies, insolvency regimes and the situation of creditors' protection should also 
be considered.  With regard to transition economies, these points are very important. In 
the early stages of transition, they are in general affected by huge macroeconomic 
disparities, experiencing high inflation and a remarkable decline in production.   
Furthermore, the transformation to a market economy begins with neither a pre-existing 
capital market, nor the support of a consolidated class of capitalists. Moreover, since banks 
in the old regime played only a passive role in supplying necessary funds to enterprises, it 
was not possible to regard them as playing a decisive role in examining the profitability of 
certain investment projects, or in governing corporate activities in accordance with market 
conditions.  The conditions with which companies were confronted were thus unstable 
and ambiguous.  At the same time, the role played by state budgets in financing 
investment projects in the socialist system was in sharp contrast to that observed in the 
process of transition.    In other words, there has been a drastic change in fiscal policy.  It 
will hence be necessary for us to take these changes into consideration.   
There are also other, more complex matters that we should take into account, such 
as the growth strategies of individual companies and the problem of corporate governance, 
since these are also factors which go to make up corporation finance mechanisms.  For 
example, the "main banking system," which was well-known as a corporate finance 
mechanism in Japan after the Second World War, was a reflection of the stage of economic 
development at the time, and an indication of the course of development the country was to 
follow in the future. In this sense, Japan's corporate finance mechanisms can be considered  
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as having been formed by a number of internal and external factors.   
This is precisely the reason we have for studying corporation finance mechanisms 
in transition economies, since they themselves are also, by definition, transitional.  
Mechanisms which reflect internal and external factors are of great importance.   
Furthermore, comparing these mechanisms will help us to forecast possible future 
developments in these economies.  In addition to this, it will also help us to deepen our 
understanding of the process of economic transition.   
In the present day 21st century, numerous transition economies of the former 
Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, especially that of Russia, are beginning to 
record a comparatively high rate of economic growth.  It would seem that the period of 
rapid economic growth observed ever since the overcoming of a certain "transition 
depression", has taken root in a similar way to the reconstruction process after World War 
II.  However, if we closely analyze the growth mechanisms in these regions, what we 
come across is a growth in consumption, or the reflection of export activities based mainly 
on natural resources and primary processed goods, or the benefits of capricious direct 
foreign investment. This means that current economic growth is not necessarily the result 
of robust investment in the equipment of domestic industries, and we cannot be sure if it is 
sustainable or not.  Since transition economies have suffered from huge differences in 
technological know-how when compared with western industrialized markets, and still 
depend upon a number of obsolete production facilities, immense investment in equipment 
would be needed if these countries are to acquire international competitiveness.    However, 
since the financial sector in these countries is also underdeveloped, and there is a lack of 
domestic capital, the demand for funds cannot be properly satisfied.     
For this reason, the ratio of self-financing in these countries is very high.    This is 
because the financial system, which undoubtedly contributes to dynamic economic growth, 
is not necessarily developed enough to respond to the actual demand private enterprises 
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1. Preceding Study on Corporate Finance   
 
A lot of research has been done on corporate finance.  Comparative studies of 
various different countries are also very popular (Iwata, 2003, Hoshino, 2003, Delbrei et al., 
2000). Some studies have asserted that there is a certain difference between models used in 
different continents, such as the Japanese model, the Anglo-Saxon one, and that in 
continental European, while others have compared particular European countries.    This is 
very interesting, because these studies closely correspond to the typology of corporate 
governance systems.    However, there have been much fewer studies on corporate finance 
in transition economies, due to difficulties in the availability of statistical data and the 
different accounting systems used.    In the case of Russia, mainstream analyses have been 
made of some major companies that are listed on the western securities markets and that 
have reported their performances in accordance with international accounting standards.  
Although such analyses are important, there has been no macro-analysis for companies on 
a whole.  Perotti et al. have clarified the actual condition of financial issues within 
company groups, through an approach that pays special attention to the composition of 
Financial Industrial Groups (FIGs) (Perotti, E.and S. Gelfer, 2001).   
In contrast, the object of this paper is to shed light upon the actual situation of 
corporate finance in Russia at a macroeconomic level.  Firstly, we will look, in an 
orthodox manner, at asset structures in Russian companies.  Secondly, we will examine 
the question of company liabilities.  We will then consider the problem of company 
finances, dividing it into three dimensions, namely: the banking sector, securities markets 
and overseas markets as sources of finance for Russian companies.     
In the case of Russia, there are even more interesting issues to be considered.    As 
is widely known, non-monetary transactions, such as barter and non-payment, became 
widespread in Russia in the 1990s.  However, normal cash transactions have been 
revitalized ever since the financial crisis of 1998.  The reasons behind this change lie in 
the fact that the liquidity of Russian companies has improved, and they do not want to use 
non-money as a means of survival, owing to the effects of substitutable imports, and a 
significant depreciation of the rouble.  Now that a lot of factors that improved the  
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situation immediately after 1998 are gradually being used up, is there any danger of 
non-monetary transactions reappearing in Russia?  If this is not the case, then it will be 
necessary for us to explain what kinds of mechanisms are helping to prevent it from 
happening.  
Issues of particular importance include the relations between industrial structures 
and corporate finance mechanisms.  Although the financial sector in Russia was 
underdeveloped, financial industrial groups (FIG’s) saw the light of day, with the support 
of large Moscow-based commercial banks, before the crisis of 1998.    An FIG is a kind of 
conglomerate, or the unified group of big commercial banks and non-financial enterprises.   
They were obliged to change dramatically after the crisis of 1998.  Some of them, 
consisting of export-oriented resource industries, such as those of oil and natural gas, have 
more means of finding financing within the group, and thus have a fairly high level of 
growth viability.  However, some bank-led FIG’s are in the process of going bankrupt.  
The current business environment in Russia is inadequate, in that creditors’ rights are not 
properly protected, and commercial banks face difficulties claiming the reimbursement of 
loans when their clients go bankrupt.  For this reason, commercial banks are no longer 
eager to give credit.  However, such a risk is avoidable if a loan is contracted within the 
same group.  This can be regarded as being one of the newly-formed mechanisms of 
corporate finance in Russia.     
It is true that ever since 1998, outstanding reimbursements in the banking sector 
have been increasing sharply.  Various factors, including a high economic growth rate, 
diminishing non-money transactions and a revision of the bankruptcy law strengthening 
creditors’ rights, could explain this change.  Also, we cannot overlook the change in 
behaviour of Russia's largest bank, Sberbank.  After the 1998 crisis Sberbank, formerly a 
savings bank, substantially increased the number of loans it granted companies.  This 
happened at the same time as the breakdown of other formerly specialized banks, such as 
Promstroibank, which the government considers as being an institution mainly used for 
providing liquidity to industries.  These changes lead us to believe that there may have 
been a certain turning point in the government's economic policy.  Sberbank, which had 
attracted more than 70 percent of the population's deposits, increased its assets by giving  
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large credits to major companies which at the time were going through a period of crisis.  
Since the Central Bank of Russia owns more than half of the shares of Sberbank, it has 
often been harshly criticized, on the grounds of a possible conflict of interests, being both a 
regulatory body and an owner of the bank.   While the introduction of a deposit insurance 
system had been delayed for a long time because of political reasons, the population's 
deposits at Sberbank were guaranteed by the state17.  Such situations have distorted the 
nature of competition in the deposit-account market.  In spite of such criticism, reform, 
including the dismantling of Sberbank, has not been carried out until recently.    This shows 
that the government wants to keep Sberbank intact.  When considering corporate finance 
mechanisms in Russia, it is also true that from this perspective, the intentions of the 
government must not be disregarded.  In addition, Sberbank is not a special bank found 
only in Russia.  Lots of banks have developed on the foundations of the former savings 
banks of the socialist system, such as OTP in Hungary, Czeska sporitelna in the Czech 
Republic, and Halyk in Kazakhstan18, all of which play an important role in their 
respective economies.  However, no other bank has been able to dominate the banking 
sector for such a long period of time as has Sberbank in Russia.    From the viewpoint of a 
comparison of reforms in the banking sector in transitional economies, this is a very 
interesting case.   
 
2. Asset Structures of Enterprises in Transition Economies: the case of Russia   
 
When analyzing corporate finance mechanisms, three perspectives are of 
particular importance, namely: the source of funds, management, and the distribution of 
products.    However, the statistical information released in Russia is altogether inadequate 
for the study of all of these points.  We will therefore try to analyze the fund flow of 
Russian companies at a macroeconomic level, approaching the problem from the 
perspective of the composition of assets and liabilities.   
                                                      
17  In 2004, the law of deposit insurance was approved and took into effect. 
18 Halyk bank was completely privatized in 2001.  Those banks have also enjoyed foreign capital 
participation.  
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(1) Some important facts about Russian statistics on corporate finance   
In the statistics released by the Russian Statistical Agency, the composition of 
assets and the structures of capital and liabilities are not shown in an aggregated form.    It 
is therefore necessary to reconstruct them from various indices.  First of all, the accounts 
receivable are not contained in the statistics of enterprises entitled "assets structure".  
Therefore, this data should be brought in from the statistics showing the settlement 
situation of companies.  On the other hand, if we look at the structure of capital and 
liabilities, equity capital and its breakdown are unknown.  Furthermore, data concerning 
the distribution of the outcome of corporate activities, such as capital surpluses and earned 
surpluses, are not presented, either.    Moreover, we must also refer to statistics which show 
the settlement situation of companies, in order to estimate the data concerning accounts 
payable and borrowing from financial institutions.  It is also impossible to decompose 
current and fixed liabilities.     
If such a point is taken into consideration, in order to analyze the asset structures 
of Russian companies, it is necessary to indirectly complement the actual conditions with 
available data.  In particular, since the data on financing is completely inadequate, we 
need to indirectly supplement it with information on the source of investment funds, the 
accounting reports of deposit acceptance banks published by the Russian central bank, and 
various securities issuances in securities markets.     
 
(2) Characteristics of Asset Structures in Russian companies   
Here the characteristics of company organization can be clarified using available 
statistics.  Tangible fixed assets represented 69.2% of the assets of Russian companies in 
1996, gradually falling to 40.3% in 2003.  On the other hand, the portion of long-term 
investment in fixed assets increased sharply from only 1.0% in 1996 to 11.5% in 2003.  
This data coincides with a tendency in Russia, since the 1998 crisis, of increasing amounts 
of fixed capital.    The ratio of liquid assets has largely remained in the 6 - 9% mark.    The 
ratio of short-term investment grew from 0.3% in 1996 to 4.0% in 2003.    Monetary assets 
(cash and deposit) also grew from 0.5% to 2.3% in the same period, which can be regarded 
as being a good result for the vibrant Russian economy.    Finally, accounts receivable more  
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than doubled, from 7.0% in 1996 to 16.6% in 2003, a point which needs to be analyzed 
more precisely, and which we will take into account further on.     
We will now look at the question of liabilities.  Since the only data we have 
available is of accounts payable and debts owed to the banking sector, as has already been 
stated above, we feel that it would be best to compute the ratio of those components, 
dividing them by the total amount of overall assets.    As for accounts payable, we see that 
there was a large increase from 9.9% in 1996 to 21.2% in 2003.  Similarly, bank 
borrowing also drastically increased, from 1.5% to 14.1%.  It would thus seem that both 
inter-enterprise credit and bank borrowing have increased rapidly in the corporate finances 
of Russian enterprises.   
In this regard, it is necessary for us to take into account the question of mutual 
credit within large groups.  It is well known that in Russian FIG’s and 
vertically-integrated corporate groups, financing is carried out by fund transfers, and 
through bookkeeping manoeuvres in mutual procurement agreements regarding materials 
and equipment. The increasing role of inter-enterprise credit may therefore, to a certain 
extent, reflect such a tendency.    However, the scope of the present paper does not include 
an in-depth study of this issue.     
 
(3) Sources of financing for investment projects   
We will now analyze the sources of funding for investment activities.  Firstly, it 
would appear that the ratio of self-financing is gradually falling.  Secondly, in what 
concerns borrowed financial resources, the proportion occupied by budget funds is also 
decreasing.   Thirdly, although the ratio of bank credits in general has been negligible and 
has changed little until recently, signs of an increase were evident in the statistics for 2003.     
When we consider the mechanisms of corporate finance in transition economies, 
the following four viewpoints are very important, namely: (a) the underdeveloped financial 
sector; (b) the inward-focused tendency of corporate governance, or the tendency that 
enterprises have of forming coalition groups for fear of hostile takeover bids, and so as not 
to depend on external financing; (c) the dependence on budgetary funds, and (d) the 
dependence on direct foreign investment or on parent companies based abroad.  We will  
     74   
therefore analyze the current situation of corporate finance mechanisms by verifying these 
points institutionally and empirically.  This hypothesis, along with the above-mentioned 
accounting report data, would seem to suggest that the tendency towards a certain 
“marketisation” of the economy is becoming increasingly apparent in Russia.  In other 
words, companies are mainly dependent upon inter-enterprise credit and short-term bank 
loans for the purpose of imminent transactions.    In contrast, in order to finance investment 
projects which fix financial resources on a longer-term basis, they have to rely upon 
internal sources of funding, and when these are not sufficient, they tend to look for the 
support of the government.  There is now a shifting tendency towards a certain 
dependence on external funds.    What’s more, although still relatively small, the increasing 
tendency of borrowing from banks in 2003 can also be regarded as being a positive change.   
I would now like to analyze this new tendency, by focusing on the latest developments in 
the financing of Russian enterprises. 
 
3. Active Financing Activities by Major Companies   
 
As already stated, direct numerical analysis is somewhat difficult, due to the 
shortage of available data on financing.  We will therefore review material from various 
mass-media, so as to comprehend the actual situation of company financing activities.   
 
(1) The Banking Sector   
First of all, there has been a sharp increase in the number of loans granted by the 
Russian banking sector.  Some of the government-related banks, such as Sberbank and 
VTB (Foreign Trade Bank), have significantly increased the number of loans given to 
companies.  
A large number of major companies, for instance, borrow from Sberbank.    On the 
other hand, these companies are the same ones that can also borrow directly from overseas 
capital markets, as we will see below.  Sberbank will sooner or later be exposed to harsh 
competition from its overseas counterparts and should re-examine, from a standpoint of 
profitability, its course of action in the near future.  Loans to small- to medium-sized  
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businesses, or credit to consumers, should be regarded as the main possible alternatives.     
 
(2) Securities markets   
Domestic capital markets in Russia have at last been revitalized, following the 
severe damage caused by the Russian crisis of 1998.    One of these, the MICEX (Moscow 
Interbank Currency Exchange) now accounts for a big share of the Russian securities 
market.  The RTS (Russian Trading System), a state-of-the-art over-the-counter 
transaction system, also plays an important role.  In particular, the securities market is a 
place where Russian companies can raise money from the stock market, including the bond 
and commercial paper markets.   
 
(3) Overseas sector     
We will now look at the situation of financing from abroad.  First of all, major 
companies have been very active in successively issuing Eurobonds.  Although this was 
once suspended following the crisis of 1998, it started again in 2000.  Though financial 
institutions are excluded, companies in resource-extraction industries, such as oil and gas, 
justifiably play a leading role in this respect.  In addition, new companies relating to 
mass-consumption, such as cell phone services and food processing, have recently 
succeeded in issuing Eurobonds, a situation that can be regarded as being a reflection of the 
considerable expansion in consumer-related industries in Russia.   
Apart from the issuing of Eurobonds, the IPO (Initial Public Offering) is also 
attracting the attention of foreign investors in overseas securities markets. It has gone 
public in the securities exchanges in New York and London. ADR transactions are also 
somewhat popular.   
Since both methods of financing are expensive for ordinary Russian companies, 
due to the high requirements of information-disclosure, syndicated loans which can avoid 
such costs are also very popular in Russia. Here we also look at the data of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS). This shows how much the financial institutions of the BIS 
member states lend out to companies and financial institutions in any given country, and 
how much they borrow. The BIS member states’ lending means that Russian companies  
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and financial institutions do in fact borrow from overseas.   
On the whole, ever since the second half of 2000, Russia has been a net borrower 
of overseas capital.    However, if we divide this capital flow into companies and banks, we 
find, to our surprise, that banks in Russia are lending out money to the BIS member banks, 
while companies are consistently taking out loans from the BIS.  This reflects a severe 
distortion in the situation of money flow in Russia.    In other words, banks in Russia have 
been lending money to foreign banks rather than to domestic companies. On the other hand, 
foreign banks lend capital to companies in Russia.  This means that there is a kind of 
“detour loan” in Russia, which is very abnormal.   
From these three paths we can conclude that Russian companies have finally 
begun to start their financial activities in accordance with the principles of the market 
economy.  That is to say, they are doing business in a more constructive way than before 
the 1998 crisis19.  They finance their activities, especially short-term ones, by means of 
inter-enterprise and bank- credits, and not through inter-enterprise arrears.  However, the 
funds fixed for longer-term activities are still insufficient, and although some leading 
companies deal with this problem in a positive manner by external financing, including that 
from overseas markets, others have to resort to retained earnings or need to call for 




Corporate finance mechanisms in Russia are changing quickly, reflecting the 
favourable trends of the Russian economy as a whole in recent years.  However, due to 
restrictions in the availability of statistical data, a lot of aspects can at present only be 
inferred.    This is an excellent reason for continuing to explore these issues.   
 
 
                                                      
19  In an extremely uncertain economic condition, all the economic subjects would have very short-sighted 
interests.    They would no longer think about long term prospect, but only a day-to-to concern, or survival of 
their own.  
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Fig. 2 A symplified balance sheet 
 
Note: The data of red covered are completely not available in Russia.  The yellow part is indirectly 
accessible.  
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Table 1a. Assets structure of Russian Enterprises (% of Total assets) 
 
 
Table 1b. Assets structure of Russian Enterprises in Mining and Industry Sector 
(% of Total assets) 
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Table 2 Source of Investment Financing (% of Total Investment)  
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Table 3. 20 Biggest Russian Companies by Capitalization for 2004 
 
 
Table 4 IPO Rush of Russian Companies to International Markets 
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Table 5 Eurobonds of Russian Non-bank Companies in Circulation (As on May 2005)  
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IV. Population Migration in Post-Soviet Russia: 
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The objectives of this paper are (1) to overview interregional migration patterns in 
Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union and (2) to examine the interrelationship 
between regional economic conditions and population migration. Although 
sociologic/geographical studies are full of fruitful results, studies based on stylized 
statistical analysis on interregional migration in Russia have started only recently. However, 
some have presented impressive results. Among them, based on gravity models, Andrienko 
et al. (2002) showed that migration decisions in Russia were strongly affected by regional 
economic conditions. This paper specializes in economic analysis on interregional 
population migration, as in our earlier study (Kumo, 2003) or Andrienko et al. (2002).   
This paper is organized as follows. First, an overview on interregional migration 
patterns in Russia from 1990s to 2000 and changes in their tendency are presented in brief. 
Migration factors are examined in Section 3, with the use of recent Goskomstat/Rosstat 
data. Changes in migration patterns, especially an extremely large out-migration from the 
Far North regions, are theoretically explained. Concluding remarks are presented in the 
final section. 
 
                                                      
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference entitled "Russian Studies Dialogue: A 
Korea-Japan Perspective" held at Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Japan on May 16, 2005 and 
the 37
th annual convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies held in Salt 
Lake City, the United States on November 5, 2005. The author acknowledges a debt of gratitude to Dr. P. A. 
Baklanov, Dr. Masaaki Kuboniwa, Dr. Ichiro Iwasaki, Dr. Kang Yoonhee, Dr. Philip Hanson and Dr. Paul 
Gregory for their valuable comments. The author is also indebted to Dr. Shin-ichiro Tabata for his continuous 
encouragement and help. This study was financially supported by a Grant-in-aid for Young Scientists B from 
the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture in Japan (#16730147, 2004-06), a Grant-in-Aid for 
Scientific Research A from the Ministry of Education, Science, Sports and Culture in Japan (#17203019, 
2005-08), the Inamori Foundation (20004-06) and the Suntory Foundation (2005-06), which are gratefully 
acknowledged.  
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2. Migration Patterns in Russia under Transition: an Overview 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union had critical effects on interregional population 
migration patterns in Russia, as is well known. Many studies have described their realities 
in detail, but some of them are reviewed briefly here for convenience.   
 
2.1 Previous Studies on Interregional Migration in the Former Soviet Union 
 
Population migration in the USSR has been studied by not a few scholars such as 
Perevedentsev (1966) and Vorob’yev (1977). However, at the beginning of his work, 
Perevedentsev (1966, p.9) stated that “there is no evidence of non-organized migration in 
the USSR as voluntary or contrary to planned and organized population migration.” If it is 
so, investigation of migration patterns in the centrally-planned Soviet Union was thought to 
be meaningless. However, as Ohtsu (1988, p.18) referred, many papers pointed out that the 
labor-balance sheet (one of the centralized plans made up to attain the equilibrium between 
demand and supply of labor) played only a minimal role.   
Indeed, population redistribution by the government had critical effects on population
geography in Russia until the end of World War II. Particularly in the regional development 
of Siberia and the Far East, the induced population redistribution must have played an 
important role. 
After the 1950s, the government prompted people to move toward the frontier by 
offering higher wages and providing jobs to newly graduated university students. These 
were the main policies used by the Soviet Union government to fill the regional labor 
demand gap (Perevedentsev, 1996; Kuprienko, 1972).   
Although large population inflows were observed until the late 1980s, Dienes (1972) 
showed that investment in Siberia and Kazakhstan was inefficient during the 1960s, when 
economic efficiency was not the prime objective of the Soviet government. However, in 
spite of the government’s policies, due to the high costs of laborers resettling in developing 
areas labor turnover ratio was rather high. According to Dienes (1972), these facts led the 
government to change investment priority and the central administration started to give  
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heavy investment on resource-abundant peripheral areas and on European parts of Russia, 
the most advanced area (TsSU SSSR,  annual  data  books).    
 
Table 2-1. Previous Studies on Migration Patterns   
in the Former Soviet Union and Russia 
Authors Rowland  Mitchneck  Cole  et al. Zaytsev Andrienko
 (1982,1989,1990) (1991)  (1992)  (1973)  et al. (2002)
Factors/Period 1959  1979     
 -1979 -1989 1968 1985 1989  1969 1992-1999
Growth in Employment      ><  ><    ⨠⨠
Industrial Growth    O        ><   
Population  Scale  O   O  O     O 
Distance           O 
Governmental Investment  ⨠ O O  ><    O   
Growth in Governmental   
Investment 
O         
 
Racial Factors  O      ⨠     
Per Capita Income  O          O  ⨠
Housing  Conditions         O   
Climate  Conditions         O   
O: Statistically significant; ><: not significant; *: ambiguous 
 
Mitchneck (1991) analyzed population migration in the USSR from the viewpoint of 
regional science. She showed that compared to distance, investment affected migration 
decision more significantly. Her analysis indicates the effect of central planning on 
population redistribution. It should be noted, however, that in Siberia and the Far East 
regions not only inflows but also large outflows were observed in the 1970s. 
 
2.2 Recent Research on Russian Regional Economies and Population Migration 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russian economy seriously 
stagnated until the end of 1990s. However, this stagnation presents different aspects from 
region to region, and this phenomenon is frequently cited as a research objective. 
TACIS (1996a, 1996b) classified each region from the following points of view: (1)  
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living conditions (income); (2) population dynamics (natural increases or migration rates); 
(3) labor market conditions (unemployment rates); (4) financial indicators (financial 
situations of regional governments); (5) structural changes (marketization or land reforms); 
(6) regional policy; and (7) reforms on banking systems. Their analysis was based on 
descriptive statistics, and their classification was very subjective.   
After TACIS (1996a, 1996b), Russian regions were studied by many, especially by 
researchers in European states. Based on some quantitative analyses, Sutherland and 
Hanson (1996) clarified that the factors that characterized regional labor market conditions 
in 1992-1993 in Russia were (1) regional exports, (2) existence of military industries, and 
(3) real income. In an earlier paper (Kumo, 1997), interregional migration was examined, 
and the following factors were identified as the main ones determining interregional 
population migration patterns in Russia: (1) quality of life (residence or transportation 
conditions), (2) labor-market conditions, and (3) climate conditions. In addition, in yet 
another paper (Kumo, 2001, 2003), it was demonstrated that regional population/market 
size may stimulate in-migration in some regions. 
However, when conducting econometric analyses, Russia still present numerous 
difficulties. In a 1997 paper (Kumo, 1997), income variables were found to be negatively 
related to in-migration, which is not typical of other developing countries. These 
phenomena could be attributed to the coexistence of high wages in Siberia or in the Far 
East regions, which were used as an enticement because of the severe climate and large 
out-migration occurring in these areas. The effects of economic factors themselves, 
however, may not be stable. Therefore, the results of the quantitative analyses are deemed 
questionable by some researchers. 
Hanson (2000) examined the effects on regional real income of saving rates, inflows 
of foreign currency, and income transferred by the central government. Although some 
significant effects were obtained, the results indicated that abnormal values must have 
critically distorted the analysis. Changing the explained variable from real income to net 
migration rates did not improve the results. 
Some researchers investigated individual regions in detail, not on the basis of 
quantitative analyses. The methods adopted by Ohtsu (2000), which focus on the  
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examination of labor-market conditions in the Far East, or those by Gimpelson and 
Monusova (2000), which focus only on public employment and income reallocation 
policies, appear to be effective. 
Such microscopic analyses, however, must be based on individual surveys. These are 
typical methods in area studies; however, this study examines the possibility of using easily 
obtainable data from macroeconomics to explain interregional migration.   
A pioneering study undertaken by Andrienko et al. (2002) uses in- and out-migration 
matrices by region (oblast’) and applies simultaneous gravity models. Although some of 
the results are ambiguous, analyzing by income strata demonstrates that income variables 
and regional economic conditions significantly affect migration decisions. The results make 
it possible to easily grasp the effects of economic factors on migration patterns in Russia. 
 
 

















1: North; 2: North-West; 3: Central; 4: Volga-Vyatka; 5: Central Black Earth; 6: Volga; 7: North Caucasus; 8: 
Ural; 9: Western Siberia; 10: Eastern Siberia; 11: Far East 
  (Source: Goskomstat RF, Avista ver.1.3, 1995.) 
 
2.3 Interregional Migration in Russia 
 
The most critical differences that become evident when comparing Russian migration  
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patterns before and after the Soviet era are (1) the emergence of large out-migration from 
the Far North regions and (2) the increases in in-migration rates into advanced/ 
industrialized areas and into warm farming regions.  
After the middle 1970s into the 1980s, when the Soviet society was recovering from 
exuberant government development strategies, great importance was placed on further 
development of already-advanced European regions and resource-mining regions. On the 
other hand, it was very difficult to entice laborers to settle in frontier areas. Higher wages 
in these areas were insufficient to offset the deficiencies in the infrastructure. In addition, it 
was quite expensive to develop the frontier because of the severe environmental conditions. 
Big projects, such as constructing new industrial zones in peripheral regions, were 
discontinued in this period. Rather, seasonal or day workers were used in underdeveloped 
areas, but these workers were only provided with barracks (Milovanov, 1994). In order to 
avoid maintaining the infrastructure and to promote short-term efficiency, the government 
intended to entice day workers into the Far North by using wage incentives. 
However, in the Far North, which has very large natural resources, development 
incentives were provided by the central administration with clearly positive results. Thus, 
large in-migration into such areas as Siberia or the Far East was observed until the end of 
the 1980s (Figure 2-2. As for regional division, see Figure 2-1). 
The collapse of the Soviet Union caused drastic changes in the patterns. As pointed 
out earlier, in-migration into already-advanced areas and out-migration from the north 
emerged in 1990s (Figure 2-2). This can be clarified when plotting net migration as 
geographical information. After the 1990s, in many regions in Siberia or in the Far East, 
percentage-scale out-migration flows were observed, excluding Chumen’, which included 
large mining bases. Comparing net-migration by region in 2000 and in 1985 may help 
understand the changes (Figure 2-3). 
Numerous causes can be cited for this phenomenon. Especially significant are the 
racial/political factors (Chechen, North Osetiya, Ingush) and return migration (from Central 
Asia and the Baltic states) (Tsentr po Tekhnicheskomu Sotrudnichestvu po Evrope i 
Tsentral’noy Azii, 1999). It would, however, be impossible and beyond the scope of this 
study to consider every possibility. Based on the author’s interest, this study is limited to  
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the analysis of economic factors. 
 























(Sources: TsSU RSFSR, 1980; TsSU RSFSR, 1981; Goskomstat Rossii, 1993; Goskomstat Rossii, 1999; 






































(Sources:  Goskomstat Rossii, 1999; Goskomstat Rossii, 2001. The criterion of regional division is 
12.5 %tile.) 
Figure 2-3. Net Migration in Each Region  
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3. Analysis of Economic Factors of Interregional Migration in Russia 
 
3.1 Empirical Analysis 
 
Official statistics are used to analyze migration factors in this section. Net migration 
rates in each region for 1994-2003 are regarded as explained variables. Migration in 1980 
and in 1985 will be examined also for comparison. Although census-based gross population 
flow data is usually utilized in detailed migration analysis, official population census was 
not conducted through the 1990s in Russia. Matrices of gross population flows among 
regions were reported in official data, but they were described based on eleven Russian 
“Economic Regions” or seven “Federal Districts”; thus, the net migration rate is taken as a 
dependent variable in this study. 
The existence of larger markets may attract people and firms to a certain location 
through economies of scale. Therefore market scale can be regarded as an explaining 
variable. Better equipment of social infrastructure and urbanization economies may 
positively affect on population flows also. Intensive economic development and better 
employment situations are supposed to affect positive migration flows. On the other hand, 
the central government strongly induced regional development in the former Soviet Union; 
hence, governmental incentives on regional development during the Soviet era might have 
attracted people in peripheral areas. Climate conditions must play critical roles in areas 
with very severe weather especially in the Far North regions which locate in the Arctic 
areas. 
The population size (POPi, in thousand) is regarded as a proxy for economic size in 
each region i. Gross regional products or gross outputs of the industrial sector are not 
utilized because (1) the price index varies from region to region and (2) the amount of 
output is recorded not at the production nodes but in regions where the headquarters locate. 
Urbanization is measured directly by the percentage share of urban population (URBANi, in 
per cent).   
As for the indicators of social infrastructure development, housing space per capita 
(DWELLi, in meter square), and surfaced road per area (ROADi, in kilometers/kilometers  
 
    97
square) were taken as a benchmark. These measures have been often utilized in this kind of 
analyses in Soviet economic studies. 
Economic conditions in regions will be represented by the percentage share of firms in 
debt (LOSSi). Per capita income and wages are not utilized because of the great differences 
in price indices by region. Unemployment rates is not taken because of unreliability in data 
in transitional period and we cannot analyze the effects of the unemployment variable on 
migration patterns during the Soviet era because of lack of data. 
Governmental incentives to develop specific regions will be considered by 
introducing per capita governmental investment in regions (INVESTi, in thousand rubles). 
To grasp how this factor affected on migration decision during the Soviet period, the same 
variable is introduced in analyzing population flows in transitional period also. 
The effects of climate conditions is examined by using the dummy variable (COLDi, 
unity for regions in Far North and zero for others) for Far North regions, which locate in 
the Arctic Circle and given special treatment by the central government in the Soviet Union 
and the Russian Federation
20. 





where Mi is net migration rate in region i (
o/oo). 
All variables are for each region (oblast’ , respublik, kray and chkotka autonomous 
okrug) are given a one-year lag in comparison with the explained variable. Autonomic 
Regions (Avtonomniy okrug) except Chkotka are included in the respective oblast’. The 
Chechen, North Ocetia and Ingush republics are excluded from the analysis because of 
their extraordinary environment. The number of samples fluctuates in some years because 
of lack of data. All data were obtained from Goskomstat Rossii, Regiony Rossii ****godu,  
                                                       
20 The Far North Regions in this study are composed of the followings: Kareliya republic, Komi republic, 
Arkhangel’ oblast’, Murman oblast’, Sakha republic, Kamchatka oblast’, Magadan oblast’, Sakhalin oblast’ 
and Chkotka autonomous district.  
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Goskomstat Rossii, Moscow, ****+1. A simple ordinary least squares analysis was 
conducted. All explaining variables except the dummy variable were transformed into 
logarithm. The results are shown in Table 3-1. 
Interpretation of the results follows. As for the analysis on migration patterns in 
1992-1993, we reserve any comments because of the social disorders and unreliability of 
data during this period. 
In the 1980s the amount of per capita governmental investment clearly showed 
positive and significant effects on migration. The critical role of development incentives 
during the Soviet era was presented. On the other hand, coefficients of this variable turned 
out to be insignificant, which can be accepted as a matter of course after the collapse of the 
centralized government of the Soviet Union.   
It is at a glance strange that the percentage share of urban population and per capita 
housing space obtained insignificant coefficients. This phenomenon can be interpreted by 
the followings: (1) regions with the highest percentage share of urban population are 
observed in the Far North Regions (there may be no farmers and no areas are classified as 
farm ones in such regions) and (2) per capita housing areas in such scarcely populated 
areas are large in comparison to the national average. It may be a supporting evidence of 
this interpretation that these variables obtained positive coefficients during the 1980s. 
The percentage share of firms in debt showed ambiguous results. When investigating 
regions individually, one can see that people flowed out from Primorskiy Kray with high 
percentage share of deficit firms, but on the other hand a large amount of population 
inflows is observed in south-western regions of Russia, where manufacturing industries are 
in severe conditions but good living environment can be enjoyed. These complicated 
phenomena might have affected on this result. 
Surfaced road density, which is a condition of regional infrastructure, showed positive 
and significant coefficients throughout the 1990s, which indicates that maintenance of 
social infrastructure in regions positively affects on population migration. If interpreting 
this result connected with above one, one can think that people do not flow into regions in 
Far North, where the percentage share of urban population is high but social infrastructure 
is poorly equipped.  
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Population size in each region obtained insignificant coefficients during the 1980s and 
affected positively in the 1990s and after on migration flows, except in 2001. The critical 
effects of political incentives given to peripheral areas during the Soviet era and 
contribution of market effects on population flows in the transformational period show 
clear contrast. 
All of these results clearly show that economic factors critically affect migration 
decisions in Russia in an intuitively understandable way. Thus, the application of stylized 
theories on the examination of interregional population migration in transformational 
Russia or on the analysis of Russian regional economies seems reasonable.
21 
A striking result is obtained for the dummy variable, which is given to the regions of 
the Far North. It was strongly significant for all years and the regression coefficient was the 
largest during the 1990s, although after 2000 the coefficients turned to be insignificant, 
which may show exhaustion of possible out-migrants in these areas. The term dummy 
variable is defined as the same as that used in this author’s 1997 and 2003 papers (Kumo, 
1997, 2003).   
As repeated, large-scale out-migration from the Far North is well recognized and is 
pointed out by many previous studies (Tsentr po Tekhnicheskomu Sotrudnichestvu po 
Evrope i Tsentral’noy Azii, 1999; Mikheeva, 2001). In this author’s papers from 1997 and 
2003 (Kumo, 1997, 2003), this phenomenon was shown to be a counteraction against 
Soviet-era development policies that were inefficient; the same was found by Mikheeva 
(2001). Mikheeva (2001), however, asserts the necessity for supporting individual regional 
economies. On the contrarily, numerous studies were recently conducted on depopulation 
in Far North regions and they assert that rather larger scale outmigration from the North is 
desirable from an economic point of view (Heleniak, 1999; Hill and Gaddy, 2003; 
Thompson, 2004; CEM, 2005). Indeed, from an economic point of view, it is questionable 
that Mikheeva’s (2001) view would be acceptable. 
 
 
                                                       
21 Concerning econometric analysis comparing before and after the Soviet era, see Kumo (1997) and Kumo 
(2003). Some variables show peculiar results during the Soviet period.    
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3.2 Interpretation 
 
The scale of out-migration from the Far North is quite large and has been regarded as 
a problematic phenomenon in previous studies (Tsentr po Tekhnicheskomu 
Sotrudnichestvu po Evrope i Tsentral’noy Azii, 1999; Mikheeva, 2001). The emergence of 
out-migration from these northern areas is, however, an adjustment process caused by 
inefficient Soviet development strategies. It should be regarded as an economically rational 
phenomenon. This is explained as follows. The logic is the same as that in the two-sector 
analysis presented by Todaro (1969). 
 
Figure 3-1. 
Effects of South-to-North Migration Caused by the Government on Social Welfare 
 
 
In Figure 3-1, MPn and MPs denote the marginal productivity of labor in the north and 
the south, respectively. The sum of Ln (labor force in the north) and Ls (labor force in the 
south) is the total labor force, which is assumed to be constant and is distributed at the 
equilibrium point E. Here, real wage rates are equalized between the north and the south.  
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The social surplus shown assumes that the military requests that a large city be built in the 
north with a labor force of 0A.     
First, in the north, the central government would set the wage rate Wn’ higher than the 
equilibrium level in order to attract laborers in the south. This wage rate would be 
determined by politics rather than economics. Laborers in the south would respond to the 
wage differential and move to the north. The population flow would continue until the 
labor supply in the north was 0A. The wage rate in the south would also increase to Ws’. 
Although wage rates were determined by the government in the USSR, the central 
government would have to increase the wage rate in the south in order to interrupt the 
excess population inflow into the north. If the wage rates in the south had been set lower 
than Ws’, a restriction would have to have been placed on population migration. However, 
this could have led to social conflict.    In addition, the wage rates in the south would have 
no influence on the total social surplus. Regardless of the wage rates in the south, only a 
transfer of welfare would have occurred. 
When the north attained the target population size 0A, this economy would have 
attained an equilibrium. The excess cost Wn’WnWsWs’ to hire 0A laborers in the north 
would only be transferred between the government and laborers. If workers were 
distributed at E, RA workers would bring the nation products of ERAC. However, RA 
workers would now be in the north, yielding only ERAB. Therefore, the nation as a whole 
would lose (the triangle) EBC. 
If the number of people migrating into the north were not so large (in other words, if 
the RA were small enough), this inefficiency would not be so meaningful. However, 
population in the Far North exceeded 12 million (Goskomstat Rossii, 1999). Furthermore, 
the population in the northern areas (Far East, East Siberia, West Siberia, and Northern 
regions) was above 38 million in 1991 (Goskomstat Rossii, 1999). The high out-migration 
rates of the northern regions during the 1990s (in Figure 2-2) were not attributed to the 
small population of these areas. The impact of the surplus population in the northern 
regions on the efficiency of the national economy may not have been as light as initially 
thought. 
In addition, if the central government had set the wage rate in the south lower than  
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Ws’, this would have then allowed people in the south to move to the north in spite of 
restrictions on free migration. Non-organized migration has contributed to the inefficient 
use of labor (e.g., Perevedentsev, 1975).   
This economic inefficiency required a change in investment policy in the 1970s 
(Dienes, 1972). The large population outflows from the Far North (depicted by the absolute 
value of the dummy variable in Table 3-1) may denote the correction of the distortion that 
had accumulated during the Soviet era. From these points of view, the evident 
out-migration from the Far North after the collapse of the Soviet Union was inevitable. 
Such a phenomenon can be regarded as natural or as a necessary evil when considering the 
necessity of increases in economic efficiency in transformational Russia, as many have 
pointed aout.. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
This study investigated migration patterns in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The migration factors in 1980, 1985, and 1994-2003 were examined, and the 
significant effects of economic factors on migration decisions were analyzed. Finally, the 
theoretical logic behind the large-scale out-migration from the Far North was presented in 
brief. 
As widely recognized, migration patterns in Russia drastically changed after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The most striking phenomenon is the large-scale 
out-migration from regions located in the Arctic Circle. It should be regarded, however, as 
an outgrowth of the distortion accumulated during the Soviet era and as an inevitable event. 
The Far North did not have any foundation for supporting a large population, and the 
out-migration seemed to be quite natural. Possibly, a change in the economic system was 
indispensable because the Soviet government could not afford the cost of the development 
strategy it had implemented in the peripheral regions. 
Passport system, which had been applied in the Soviet Union was eliminated, and this 
relieved the migration process. Figure 2-2 shows some of these changes, including the low 
migration rates during the Soviet era and increases in migration after the 1990s. The  
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elimination of limitations on the flow of interregional population undoubtedly had an effect 
on this phenomenon. Although one can observe that the scale of out-migration flows from 
the Far North is decreasing from Figure 2-2, this may only indicate the exhaustion of 
possible out-migrants in these areas. Rather, policy implementation to induce outflows 
from the North may be required in order to support resettlement of underfunded residents 
(Thompson, 2004). 
Of course, the population outflows from the Far East could result in a shortage of 
labor resources, worsening of the public order, or other social unrests in the region. 
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